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ARTICLES 
Acting Differently:  
How Science on the Social Brain Can 
Inform Antidiscrimination Law 
SUSAN D. CARLE* 
Legal scholars are becoming increasingly interested in 
how the literature on implicit bias helps explain illegal dis-
crimination. However, these scholars have not yet mined all 
of the insights that science on the social brain can offer an-
tidiscrimination law. That science, which researchers refer 
to as social neuroscience, involves a broadly interdiscipli-
nary approach anchored in experimental natural science 
methodologies. Social neuroscience shows that the brain 
tends to evaluate others by distinguishing between “us” ver-
sus “them” on the basis of often insignificant characteris-
tics, such as how people dress, sing, joke, or otherwise be-
have. Subtle behavioral markers signal social identity and 
group membership, which in turn trigger the brain’s ten-
dency toward us versus them thinking. This research speaks 
to the considerations underlying antidiscrimination law, and 
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suggests that social neuroscientists and antidiscrimination 
theorists should be in conversation.  
Indeed, my investigation shows that social neuroscience 
and legal antidiscrimination theory are reaching a “consil-
ience”—meaning an unlikely agreement in approaches be-
tween disparate academic subjects. Both agree on the im-
portance of promoting tolerance for human behavioral dif-
ference. The time is ripe to explore this consilience more 
deeply. I do so preliminarily in this Article, proposing that 
antidiscrimination law should pay more attention to (1) the 
ways in which discrimination occurs through decision-mak-
ers’ distaste for those who “act differently” (rather than 
identity status alone), and (2) the need for more theory sup-
porting a general human right to “act differently” within 
reasonable bounds.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In one of many extraordinary moments in the last U.S. presiden-
tial campaign, then-candidate Donald Trump mocked the arm move-
ments of a reporter with a condition that causes bent wrists.1 Hold-
ing his hands in a twisted position, Trump proclaimed, “You gotta 
see this guy,” and flailed his arms to “imitate” the reporter’s disabil-
ity.2 This was far from the only time Trump ridiculed or condemned 
                                                                                                         
 1  See Alan Gathright & Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump Says Hillary Clinton 
Is ‘Wrong’ to Say He Mocked a Disabled Reporter, POLITIFACT (Oct. 20, 2016, 
1:31 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/oct/20/don-
ald-trump/donald-trump-says-hillary-clinton-wrong-say-he-moc/. 
 2  Id. (describing Trump’s denial as false and providing a video of Trump’s 
words and actions). The reporter “speaks with a normal voice and doesn’t flail his 
arms around.” Id. 
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others for allegedly acting differently. Trump falsely characterized 
social groups as acting differently in many ways. His campaign rhet-
oric included repeated claims that Mexicans commit crime, engage 
in drug dealing, and commit rapes and murders.3 Trump character-
ized Syrian refugees as supporting ISIS,4 Muslims as supporting ter-
rorism,5 and African Americans as well as Latinos as committing 
the “overwhelming amount of violent crime in our major cities.”6 In 
all of these and many more instances, Trump linked a social cate-
gory with allegedly aberrant ways of acting; in other words, he re-
viled people for acting differently.  
Social scientists correlate Trump’s rhetoric with a rise in the so-
cial acceptability of expressing prejudiced opinions.7 Hate-watch 
groups document a significant uptick in the incidence of hate crimes 
throughout the United States.8  Even more disturbingly, Trump’s 
                                                                                                         
 3  See, e.g., Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mex-
ico, TIME (Aug. 31, 2016), http://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meet-
ing-insult/ (quoting Trump saying, inter alia, “They’re bringing drugs. They’re 
bringing crime. They’re rapists”); Theodore Schleifer, Trump: Mexican ‘Rapists’ 
Coming Now, Middle East ‘Terrorists’ Coming Soon, CNN: POLITICS (June 25, 
2015, 8:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/25/politics/donald-trump-mexi-
cans-terrorists-immigration-2016/ (quoting Trump saying, inter alia, “Some are 
good and some are rapists and some are killers”).  
 4  Brinley Bruton, Katy Tur & Molly Roecker, Trump Tells Rally Syria Ref-
ugees ‘Probably’ ISIS as Muslim Protester Removed, NBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2016, 
11:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-tells-rally-
syria-refugees-probably-isis-muslim-protester-removed-n493316. 
 5  Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline 
of Trump’s Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-is-
lam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/?utm_ 
term=.87c3e4bdeab9. 
 6  Roque Planas, Donald Trump Blames Crime on Blacks, Hispanics, HUFF 
POST (June 5, 2013, 8:04 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trump-
blames-crime_n_3392535 (quoting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
TWITTER (June 5, 2013, 4:05 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/sta-
tus/342190428675796992?lang=en).  
 7  Chris S. Crandall & Mark H. White, II, Trump and the Social Psychology 
of Prejudice, UNDARK (Nov. 17, 2016), https://undark.org/article/trump-social-
psychology-prejudice-unleashed/.  
 8  See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HATE & EXTREMISM, CAL. STATE UNIV., 
SAN BERNARDINO, FINAL U.S. STATUS REPORT: HATE CRIME ANALYSIS & FORE-
CAST FOR 2016/2017 (2017), https://csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb_csbs/files/Final% 
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rhetoric against those who allegedly act differently may have helped 
rather than hurt him in the polls in 2016.9 Something about mocking 
others based on behavioral stereotypes appealed to many voters.10  
It comes as no surprise that people may be reviled based on per-
ceived conduct differences. Examples from classic racist, anti-Se-
mitic, and homophobic rhetoric vividly illustrate this. Reconstruc-
tion Era racist Ben Davis described the “Jim Crow Negro” as “an 
abnormal product” who lives “in the realm of the superficial,” lacks 
good character and respectability, and is an “idle, educated misfit.”11 
Nazi Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels condemned 
Jews as “instigators, rabble-rousers and slave drivers,” who are 
“bloodthirsty and vengeful agitators and political lunatics,” exhibit 
“rage and deep hatred,” “follow a different moral code,” and engage 
in “countless crimes.”12 In 1978, best-selling author Tim LaHaye 
described gay people’s behavior as angry, obsessively selfish, and 
exhibiting a “sinful life style that contagiously reaches into the 
minds of otherwise normal young people,”13 while California Sena-
tor John Briggs argued for firing all gay teachers because “most of 
them are seducing young boys in toilets.”14 I need not further bela-
                                                                                                         
20Hate%20Crime%2017%20Status%20Report%20pdf.pdf. 
 9  See Sean McElwee & Jason McDaniel, Economic Anxiety Didn’t Make 
People Vote Trump, Racism Did, NATION (May 8, 2017), https://www.thena-
tion.com/article/economic-anxiety-didnt-make-people-vote-trump-racism-did/ 
(discussing the authors’s analysis of the “American National Election Studies pre-
and post-election survey” and concluding, “Trump accelerated a realignment in 
the electorate around racism, across several different measures of racial animus–
and that it helped him win”). 
 10  Cf. id. (“Both racial resentment and black influence animosity are signifi-
cant predictors of Trump support among white respondents . . . .”). 
 11  Ben Davis, The Jim Crow Negro: Editor Ben Davis’ Observations, RICH-
MOND PLANET, Dec. 13, 1919, at 3, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/ 
sn84025841/1919-12-13/ed-1/seq-4.pdf. 
 12  Joseph Goebbels, The War and the Jews, CALVIN C.: GERMAN PROPA-
GANDA ARCHIVE, http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goeb 
37.htm (last vistited Mar. 23, 2019) (originally published in JOSEPH GOEBBELS, 
DER STEILE AUFSTIEG 263–70 (1944)).  
 13  TIM F. LAHAYE, THE UNHAPPY GAYS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW 
ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 46−47, 51, 153 (1978). 
 14  History of the Anti-Gay Movement Since 1977, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. 
CTR.: INTELLIGENCE REP. (Apr. 28, 2005), https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
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bor this disturbing point: “othering”—or rendering subhuman a re-
viled out-group—often involves characterizing that group’s behav-
ior as abhorrently different.15  
Perceived difference in the way people act can trigger ill treat-
ment in several ways. One involves actual differences in human be-
ings’ biological makeup, as in the example involving the reporter 
Trump mocked for having a physiological difference.16 Disability 
advocates have begun to use the term neurodiversity to capture these 
biologically based human variations.17 I have previously written on 
discrimination based on neurologically based differences in how 
people behave socially,18 so here I will not focus on that topic—i.e., 
on discrimination on the basis of acting differently that generally 
falls within the ambit of disability rights law. My prior analysis in 
that article, however, provides an important building block for the 
arguments I present here. It matters not whether behavioral differ-
ence arises from an “impairment” or any other source: such differ-
ence often constitutes a basis for invidious discrimination.19  
The examples of racist, anti-Semitic, and homophobic rhetoric I 
just offered involve another kind of acting differently. In those ex-
amples, hatemongers use allegations that social out-groups act dif-
ferently as a reason to revile them.20 Just as perceptions that some-
one acts differently can produce discrimination in the disability law 
                                                                                                         
hate/intelligence-report/2005/history-anti-gay-movement-1977; see also Evelyn 
Schlatter, 18 Anti-Gay Groups and Their Propaganda, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. 
CTR.: INTELLIGENCE REP. (Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/intelligence-report/2010/18-anti-gay-groups-and-their-propaganda; The Re-
ligious Right and Anti-Gay Speech: Messengers of Love or Purveyors of Hate?, 
WIRED STRATEGIES: MATTHEW SHEPARD ONLINE RESOURCES, http://www.wired 
strategies.com/sheldon.html (providing a long list of quotes from gay bashers at-
tributing abhorrent conduct to gay people).  
 15  See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 16  See Gathright & Jacobson, supra note 1. 
 17  See, e.g., THOMAS ARMSTRONG, THE POWER OF NEURODIVERSITY 8 (2011) 
(defining the concept of neurodiversity and explaining its relationship to disability 
rights advocacy).  
 18  See Susan D. Carle, Analyzing Social Impairments Under Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1109 (2017) [hereinafter 
Carle, Social Impairments].  
 19  See id. at 1170–80. 
 20  See, e.g., Goebbels, supra note 12. 
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context, perceptions on the basis of group identity can generate dis-
crimination against any social out-group whose members are per-
ceived as different based on socially constructed meanings attached 
to perceived behavior.21  
A third type of discrimination arises from negative reactions to 
individuals or groups who act differently as a means of protest. Dis-
sidents exemplify this third kind of acting differently; included in 
this category are whistleblowers, who buck codes of loyalty and se-
crecy in work groups to expose organizational wrongdoing. In this 
Article, I argue that retaliation against dissenters involves another 
form of discrimination based on acting differently.22  
Antidiscrimination law currently treats acts of discrimination 
against persons with social disabilities,23 members of social out-
groups,24 and dissenters25 largely as separate forms of discrimina-
tion. My argument, based on social neuroscience, is that, at bottom, 
each of these three varieties of illegal discrimination are much the 
same. All arise from similar, neurally based phenomena. Antidis-
crimination law should better recognize this.26   
This Article is the last in a series of three I have devoted to the 
general topic of antidiscrimination law and human beings acting dif-
ferently.27 My prior articles focused primarily on legal doctrine, as 
well as its development as a matter of civil rights history.28 This Ar-
ticle steps away from the details of law and legal history to take a 
broader, tentative interdisciplinary social science perspective. With 
the eyes of a neophyte, I explore the insights of experimental sci-
ence—especially the relatively new interdisciplinary field called so-
cial neuroscience, which explores (among many other topics) how 
                                                                                                         
 21  See infra Section II.A.1. 
 22  See infra Section II.A.4.  
 23  See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (2012). 
 24  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 25  See id. § 2000e-3(a). 
 26  See infra Section II.A.1. 
 27  See Susan D. Carle, Angry Employees: Revisiting Insubordination in Title 
VII Cases, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 186 (2016) [hereinafter Carle, Angry Em-
ployees]; Carle, Social Impairments, supra note 18. 
 28  See, e.g., Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27; Carle, Social Impair-
ments, supra note 18; Susan D. Carle, Conceptions of Agency in Social Movement 
Scholarship, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 522 (2014) [hereinafter Carle, Agency]. 
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and why the brain tends unconsciously to discriminate against others 
perceived to have behavioral differences.29  
Legal scholars have long mined the findings of psychology to 
assist them in constructing legal doctrine.30 Over the past few dec-
ades, they have begun exploring the research on implicit bias to help 
explain why illegal discrimination continues to be rampant despite 
decades of prohibition.31 It is important to point out at the outset that 
implicit bias does not completely explain discrimination.32 It does 
not, for example, capture the many complex historical and structural 
forces that present “built-in headwinds” for traditionally excluded 
outsiders.33 But the science on implicit bias can provide part of the 
explanation for the complex phenomenon of persistent discrimina-
tion in U.S. society.34  
In this Article, I mine social neuroscientists’ work on how and 
why implicit bias occurs, focusing on the science about how the 
brain automatically and non-volitionally processes cues that mark 
persons as in-group versus out-group members.35 What often mat-
ters to the brain is not status or identity per se, but what the brain 
perceives about how a person’s behavior reflects identity.36 These 
findings suggest that antidiscrimination law, too, should focus more 
on the links between perceptions of behavior—or “acting differ-
ently,” as I will put it throughout this Article—and discrimination.37  
                                                                                                         
 29  See John T. Cacioppo & Jean Decety, An Introduction to Social Neurosci-
ence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 3, 7 (Jean Decety & 
John T. Cacioppo eds., 2015) [hereinafter SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK]. 
 30  See generally ANNE C. DAILEY, LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A PSYCHO-
ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 38–73 (2017) (discussing the history of legal scholars’ 
use of psychology).  
 31  For a recent summary of the empirical literature showing the continuing 
persistence of discrimination in U.S. workplaces, see Joseph A. Seiner, The Dis-
crimination Presumption, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115, 1128–45 (2019).  
 32  See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 950 (2006). 
 33  See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (discussing dis-
crimination based on “built-in headwinds”). 
 34  For a discussion of the historical development of the legal concepts of dis-
parate impact and structural discrimination, see Susan D. Carle, A Social Move-
ment History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2011). 
 35  See infra Sections I.A.2, I.C. 
 36  See infra Section I.A.2. 
 37  See infra Section II.A.1. 
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The normative arguments that arise from this focus can produce 
both modest and more far-reaching proposals. Modest proposals call 
on judges, lawyers, scholars, legislators and others to focus on how 
persons may be discriminated against based on how they are per-
ceived to act in relation to their identities.38 In U.S. law today,39 stat-
utory prohibitions on discrimination in employment—the area of an-
tidiscrimination law on which I will focus here40—are limited to a 
handful of types of status distinctions. In federal antidiscrimination 
law, 41  these protected statuses are race and color, sex, national 
origin, religion,42 age,43 and disability.44 In the eyes of Congress, 
only discrimination based on these statuses raises sufficient con-
cerns to warrant antidiscrimination protections, usually because of 
the severity of the nation’s history of mistreatment against these 
identity groups.45 Put most simply, it is illegal for an employer to 
discriminate against persons based on their status as members of tra-
ditional outsider categories.  
                                                                                                         
 38  See infra Section II.A.1. 
 39  To keep this project manageable, I focus exclusively on U.S. law, though 
much could be gained from comparative approaches.  
 40  I focus on employment law because it is an area both rich in antidiscrimi-
nation theory and of large importance to contemporary U.S. society. See generally 
CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003) (presenting an extended argument 
about the importance of workplace relations to U.S. society). Many of the points 
I make in this Article concerning employment antidiscrimination law can easily 
be extended to other antidiscrimination fields. See Carle, Social Impairments, su-
pra note 18. 
 41  Some states protect against more types of status discrimination. The Dis-
trict of Columbia, for example, covers all of the statuses listed above, plus “mar-
ital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, 
familial status, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, genetic 
information, . . . source of income, status as a victim of an intrafamily offense, 
and place of residence or business.” D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (2019).  
 42  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 
(2012). 
 43  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 
621–634 (2012). 
 44  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (2012). Discrimination based on genetic information is also prohibited un-
der the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–
2000ff-11 (2012). 
 45  For ease of reference, I refer to these as “traditional outsider” categories. 
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To be sure, illegal discrimination continues to occur based solely 
on perceived status, i.e., based on visible markers connecting a per-
son with a traditional outsider group.46 However, as many antidis-
crimination theorists point out, much of this stark “first-generation” 
discrimination has gone underground.47 In today’s second- (or even 
third- or fourth-) generation landscape, discrimination often takes 
place in a manner that is more subtle and complex.48  
Social neuroscience adds science-based, empirically derived 
discoveries about how the brain works, showing that it is often per-
ceptions of behavior—i.e., acting differently—rather than social 
identity per se, that triggers bias.49 These findings lend support to 
longstanding reform proposals that would turn courts and other pol-
icy influencers’ attention toward the performance of identity, rather 
                                                                                                         
 46  For example, in tests involving two candidates with identical resumes, one 
of whom has a “[w]hite sounding” name and the other a name perceived as likely 
to be African American, the apparently white candidate is fifty percent (50%) 
more likely to be called for an interview than the apparently African American 
candidate. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg 
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination 1–3, 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 9873, 
2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873 (presenting results of a study finding 
these results at a highly statistically significant level of certainty); see also THEL-
TON E. HENDERSON CTR. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY: THE EVIDENCE 7 (2012), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/thcsj 
/EOTheEvidence.pdf (presenting statistical evidence on employment inequality); 
Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Dis-
crimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 181, 187 (2008) (finding that African Americans are more likely to be 
unemployed and paid less than whites). 
 47  See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465−68 (2001) (defining first-
generation discrimination as “deliberate exclusion or subordination based on race 
or gender[,]” which “violated clear and uncontroversial norms of fairness and for-
mal equality” and analyzing methods of addressing “second generation” discrim-
ination, which is more difficult to detect and address than first generation discrim-
ination).  
 48  Id. at 468. (“‘[S]econd generation’ most accurately refers to a subtle and 
complex form of bias[,]” which is “difficult to trace directly to intentional, 
discrete actions of particular actors.”). 
 49  See infra Section I.A.1. 
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than identity per se, in detecting and rectifying illegal discrimina-
tion.50 These findings suggest some other relatively modest doctrinal 
reforms as well, as I will discuss in Section II.A.  
A more far-reaching proposal would call on policy influencers 
to embrace a general human right “to act differently.”51 The broad 
principle of promoting greater tolerance for human difference 
emerges as a key point of consilience—meaning “agreement be-
tween the approaches to a topic of different academic subjects, es-
pecially science and the humanities”52— between social neurosci-
ence and legal theory. Just as this principle emerges from social neu-
roscience, disparate legal scholars, writing in a variety of subfields 
spanning antidiscrimination theory to civil rights history, have 
moved toward such a concept.53 As I will show in Part II, leading 
scholars in these fields have in recent decades begun to explore the 
right to act differently, at least in an abstract, aspirational way.54  
Current U.S. law comes nowhere near supporting such a broad 
right, however, and it might be unworkable and even counterpro-
ductive to try to legislate tolerance in any event. 55 Recognition of a 
general human right to act differently thus may not be best achieved 
through legal prescription. Instead, valuing a general human right to 
act differently may be an aspirational norm toward which antidis-
crimination law can “nudge” society even without a direct, formal, 
or “hard law” mandate.56 The time appears ripe to explore these pos-
sibilities arising from the emerging consilience between fields. This 
Article sets out to do so.  
This Article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, Part I 
lays out the basic social neuroscience findings relevant to my argu-
ment. Part II links this social neuroscience to the ongoing conversa-
tion among legal antidiscrimination scholars, and traces the insights 
                                                                                                         
 50  See, e.g., DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RE-
THINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 1−4 (2013) (arguing that discrimi-
nation occurs in actors’ responses to how individuals “perform” protected identi-
ties).  
 51  See infra Section II.B. 
 52  Consilience, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015). 
 53  See infra Section II.B.1. 
 54  See infra Section II.B.1 (offering an extended discussion of this literature).  
 55  See infra Section II.B.2. 
 56  See infra Section II.B.2. 
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that emerge from such a mapping in order to discern fruitful paths 
forward for antidiscrimination law and policy.57 Specifically, it rec-
ommends (1) expanding recognition of discrimination based not 
only on protected status but also how persons are perceived as acting 
differently; and (2) promoting antidiscrimination law’s broad prin-
ciple—if not, at this point, doctrine itself—recognizing a general 
right to “act differently” within reasonable bounds.58  
Before continuing, it will be helpful to address some of the likely 
objections a law-focused audience may raise to this project. The first 
obvious question is, why turn to social neuroscience? To be sure, 
overreliance on social science (or any other discipline), has many 
dangers: One need only invoke the Nazis’ use of neuroscience to 
                                                                                                         
 57  See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 32 (introducing the science concern-
ing implicit bias to a legal audience); see also Erik J. Girvan, When Our Reach 
Exceeds Our Grasp: Remedial Realism in Antidiscrimination Law, 94 OR. L. REV. 
359 (2016) (proposing to expand antidiscrimination rights based on studies of im-
plicit bias); Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Race, Ethnicity, and Place 
Identity: Implicit Bias and Competing Belief Systems, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 313, 
318−29 (2015) (researching literature on evidence of bias in the housing indus-
try); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias 
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010) (examining how law and legal insti-
tutions should respond to new scientific discoveries on social cognition); Ann C. 
McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 MO. L. REV. 443, 449 (2010) (citing so-
cial neuroscience studies to explain unconscious bias in employment discrimina-
tion).  
 58  Of course, a reasonableness limit must apply when recognizing a right to 
act differently. Liberal philosophers propose the limiting principle of not doing 
harm to others. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 139 (David Brom-
wich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859) (stating that persons 
should be permitted to do whatever they want as long as they do not harm others). 
Although line-drawing is an important issue, it will not be my goal in this Article 
to take up this matter; instead, my focus is on detecting in both antidiscrimination 
law and social neuroscience the emergence of a principle supporting an expanded 
right to act differently.  
An illustration of the complexity of determining the bounds of reasonableness 
in recognizing a right to act differently comes from the literature showing that 
sometimes even law-breaking behavior improves society. See, e.g., EDUARDO 
MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, 
PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP at viii−ix (2010) 
(summarizing their thesis that violating property laws can lead to positive social 
change).  
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horrific ends to win this point.59 However, this point does not prove 
its opposite—i.e., that experimental science may not helpfully in-
form legal theory. The task is a pragmatic one: to use what is useful, 
always with an appropriate dose of skepticism and detachment from 
strong conviction; to discard what is not; and, as the proverb goes, 
wisely to judge the difference. Whether this Article accomplishes 
that middle way is up to the reader to decide. What I offer is a con-
tribution to a complex collective project of looking for points for 
joinder across fields of human knowledge (as well as points for in-
terdisciplinary critique) in times that demand fully mining the best 
ideas we can find.  
Science does not answer value questions; it cannot tell us what 
kind of society we should strive to achieve.60 Experimental social 
science instead adopts a utilitarian moral outlook; it accepts that, 
from a utilitarian perspective, prejudice is a counter-utilitarian waste 
of human resources that society could put to higher value use.61 
With these assumptions in place for purposes of establishing a start-
ing place, this Article explores how social neuroscience might help 
shape antidiscrimination policy and law.  
Other pragmatic considerations motivate this project as well. 
Current political and social conditions call for modes of discourse 
anchored in information derived from the use of scientific method-
ologies. In a world of “alternative facts,”62 establishing verifiable 
                                                                                                         
 59  See Aleksandra Loewenau & Paul J. Windling, Nazi Medical Research in 
Neuroscience: Medical Procedures, Victims, and Perpetrators, 33 CAN. BULL. 
MED. HIST. 418, 418, 421−25 (2016) (examining unethical Nazi “medical 
procedures as they relate to the field of neuroscience”).  
 60  Understanding Science: How Science Really Works, U.C. BERKELEY, 
https://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/_0_0/whatisscience_12 (last visited Mar. 23, 
2019). 
 61  See JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP 
BETWEEN US AND THEM 124–28, 189, 212 (2013) (explaining the theoretical con-
nections between utilitarianism and science and arguing for the benefits of adopt-
ing a utilitarian moral framework).  
 62  See Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered ‘Alternative 
Facts’ on Crowd Size, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/index.html (reporting on 
Trump advisor Kellyanne Conway’s use of the term “alternative facts”); see also 
Piers Brendon, Death of Truth: When Propaganda and ‘Alternative Facts’ First 
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and replicable findings matters far more than it did in the recent past. 
Whereas two decades ago legal scholars enjoyed exploring post-
modern theories on the relativity of truth, today the same scholars 
find themselves extolling the ideas of the Enlightenment.63 These 
ideas include the basic tenets of scientific thinking, which involve 
generating valid empirical observations, testable hypotheses, and 
replicable results.64 Empirically tested, well-documented, peer-re-
viewed, published, and replicated findings provide an initial ground-
work for arguments about policies, principles, and values.65 They do 
not end arguments but they should at least figure into the discussion.  
Of course, political and ideological predispositions influence ex-
perimental social scientists’ (as all scholars’) interests.66 But the sci-
entific method’s emphases on verification through statistical analy-
sis and replication of findings provides a disciplining check.67  I 
therefore rely heavily on leading experts’ syntheses of research find-
ings considered highly respected work in the field.68 From the cau-
                                                                                                         
Gripped the World, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/media/2017/mar/11/death-truth-propaganda-alternative-facts-gripped-
world (taking an historical approach to the alternative facts phenomenon by ana-
lyzing various government regimes and their use of propaganda). 
 63  Anne Marie Lofaso, Workers’ Rights as Natural Human Rights, 71 U. MI-
AMI L. REV. 565, 608, 610–11 (2017) (noting the connection between Enlighten-
ment and human rights values). 
 64  See id. at 612. 
 65  See Elaine McArdle, The New Empiricists, HARV. L. TODAY (May 4, 
2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/feature/the-new-empiricists/. 
 66  See Torsten Wilholt, Bias and Values in Scientific Research, 40 STUD. 
HIST. & PHIL. SCI 92, 92–94 (2009). 
 67  Id. at 99. 
 68  In the past two decades, internal critics in the natural sciences have called 
on researchers, including social psychologists, to adhere to tighter methodological 
standards and ensure the replicability of their research results. See, e.g., Open Sci. 
Collaboration, An Open, Large-Scale, Collaborative Effort to Estimate the Repro-
ducibility of Psychological Science, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 657, 657 (2012) 
(describing “open, large-scale, collaborative effort to systematically examine the 
rate and predictors of reproducibility in psychological science”); Harold Pashler 
& Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Editors’ Introduction to the Special Section on Repli-
cability in Psychological Science: A Crisis of Confidence?, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 528, 528 (2012) (outlining the background of the replication crisis in science 
generally and introducing a special collection of articles addressing recommended 
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tious perspective of an interested outsider with an overlapping re-
search agenda, I turn to recognized experts in social neuroscience 
subfields to build a conversation between social neuroscience and 
legal antidiscrimination theory.   
Objections to this project can come from the obvious inability of 
brain-based science to predict individual human behavior, along 
with the related problems of attempting to use neuroscience evi-
dence in particular legal cases.69 I hasten to point out that these are 
not the topics of this Article. Nor do I in general venture into the 
many thorny questions neuroscientists face about what regions of 
the brain are involved in various neural functions; problems con-
cerning the locations of various brain-based processes do not matter 
to the questions I investigate here.70  
                                                                                                         
paths forward in the social sciences). This development is leading to ongoing re-
vision of the canon of well-accepted research findings. See Pashler & Wagenmak-
ers, supra, at 528. This points to the need for skepticism about what we think we 
know. In this Article, I exercise caution in my citation practices, relying on the 
“best” recognized work even though I realize I may be overlooking other im-
portant work in doing so. As a fellow scholar who dislikes the phenomenon of 
groupthink in my own field, I apologize in advance but feel the need to be guided 
by authority in venturing into fields that are new for me.  
 69  See Judith G. Edersheim, Can Neuroscience Predict Human Behavior?, 
HUFF POST: LIFE (Dec. 14, 2012, 10:58 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/en-
try/traumatic-brain-injury_n_2296203. The use of neuroscience in particular 
cases is not my topic here. For that inquiry, see the burgeoning literature focusing 
on the use of neuroscience in criminal law cases. See, e.g., Emily Hughes, The 
Empathic Divide in Capital Trials: Possibilities for Social Neuroscientific Re-
search, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 553−65 (using social neuroscientific studies 
to understand jurors’ feelings toward capital defendants); Dale Larson, A Fair and 
Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering the Implicit Association 
Test During Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 139, 141 (2010) (studying the 
effect of implicit bias in criminal trials where the defendant’s race is different 
from the race of the jurors); Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Im-
plicit Bias, 126 YALE L.J. F. 406, 410–15 (2017), http://www.yalelawjour-
nal.org/forum/systemic-implicit-bias (discussing implicit bias in the criminal jus-
tice system).  
 70  Indeed, as expert neuroscientist Dr. Terry Davidson pointed out in com-
menting on my Article at a WCL workshop, it is not clear that specific brain re-
gions account for various activities. See Janelle Beadle & Daniel Tranel, Social 
Neuroscience: A Neuropsychological Perspective, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 
HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 49, 56–58 (describing difficulties in determining the 
specific brain areas responsible for cognitive processes).  
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A final likely objection comes from the historical—and cur-
rent—association of social neuroscience with a field that scholars 
now call evolutionary biology. Many progressives oppose evolu-
tionary biology’s claims that human social behavior arises from the 
dictates of evolution.71 It is certainly the case that many experi-
mental social scientists with a natural science orientation are intel-
lectually committed to a wide range of versions of evolutionary bi-
ology.72 One may reject evolutionary biology—or be agnostic or 
skeptical (as I am)—and still find the experimentally based, repli-
cated, and statistically significant findings of social neuroscience 
highly interesting and informative (as I do). In other words, one need 
not accept all of the intellectual commitments of natural science-
based experimental psychology to gain a great deal from an inter-
disciplinary conversation. With these preliminaries cleared away, I 
put that conversation in motion below.  
I. THE INSIGHTS OF SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE  
A.  Social Neuroscience Basics 
1. INTELLECTUAL SOURCES 
Most simply put, social neuroscience studies, from a natural sci-
ence-based, broadly interdisciplinary perspective, how the “social 
brain” works.73 As an interdisciplinary field,74 social neuroscience 
borrows from many natural science traditions. From medical stud-
ies, social neuropsychologists borrow techniques that test what so-
cial deficits occur when persons experience brain damage in partic-
ular locations of the brain.75 Medical investigators have used this 
                                                                                                         
 71  For a helpful summary of this critical literature, see Rachel O’Neill, Fem-
inist Encounters with Evolutionary Psychology, 30 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST STUD. 
345, 345−48 (2015) (introducing a multi-perspective symposium on this evolu-
tionary psychology and summarizing existing literature critical of and defending 
this field).  
 72  See, e.g., GREENE, supra note 61, at 23, 347–48 (expressing a commitment 
to evolutionary theory).  
 73  Svenja Matusall et al., The Emergence of Social Neuroscience as an Aca-
demic Discipline, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 9, 9.  
 74  Cacioppo & Decety, supra note 29, at 5 (noting that “[s]ocial neuroscience 
emerged in the early 1990s as a new interdisciplinary academic field”).  
 75  Beadle & Tranel, supra note 70, at 49, 52. 
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technique, known as brain lesion studies, for centuries.76 Social neu-
roscientists also use very new technologies, such as electromagnetic 
brain mapping, to study how the brain responds to social stimuli.77 
They draw on a multitude of other experimental methodologies to 
study how the brain performs social behavior as well, including 
game theory, computer modeling, behavioral economics, epidemi-
ology, animal behavior studies, and experimental social and devel-
opmental psychology. 78  
Social neuroscientists accept some of the premises of classic 
philosophers and social theorists but reject others. Most signifi-
cantly, they refute the Cartesian division of human consciousness 
into a non-physical realm of the mind and a tangible, material realm 
of the corporeal body.79  Instead, social neuroscientists locate all 
mental functioning in the physical brain and study it as such.80 They 
                                                                                                         
 76  Chris Rorden & Hans-Otto Karnath, Opinion, Using Human Brain Lesions 
to Infer Function: A Relic from a Past Era in the fMRI Age?, 5 NATURE REVIEWS 
NEUROSCIENCE 813, 813 (2004). For example, neuroscientists have determined 
that persons with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex show a reduced 
“capacity for social emotions (e.g., compassion, empathy, [and] guilt),” even 
though their ability to engage in utilitarian reasoning appears unaffected. Beadle 
& Tranel, supra note 70, at 59.  
 77  Matusall et al., supra note 73, at 17–20. 
 78  See Cacioppo & Decety, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that social neurosci-
ence draws on the behavioral and social sciences as well as the neurosciences to 
investigate complex human behavior across multiple levels of analysis); Matusall 
et al., supra note 73, at 9–10, 17–20 (discussing the contribution to social neuro-
science of social psychology as well as brain neuroimaging studies, animal stud-
ies, behavioral economics, and psychiatry); infra Section I.A.2.  
 79  See Julian Paul Keenan et al., An Overview of Self-Awareness and the 
Brain, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 314, 314−15; see 
also EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 96−97 
(1998) [hereinafter WILSON, CONSILIENCE] (describing philosophers such as Des-
cartes and Kant as having “failed models of the brain” and arguing that “the fun-
damental explanation of mind is an empirical rather than a philosophical or reli-
gious quest”). 
 80  See Keenan et al., supra note 79, at 315, 319–21. Social neuroscientists 
even believe that they will soon locate the seat of consciousness, a puzzle that has 
stymied philosophers for centuries. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE SOCIAL CON-
QUEST OF EARTH 9 (2012) [hereinafter WILSON, SOCIAL CONQUEST] (“Within a 
generation, we likely will have progressed enough to explain the physical basis of 
consciousness.”). 
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acknowledge a debt to Sigmund Freud for proposing that the uncon-
scious plays a large role in human behavior, but view the substance 
of most of his theories, which lack grounding in controlled experi-
mentation, as wildly off base.81 Instead, social neuroscientists trace 
their conception of the unconscious to the pioneering experimental 
work of late nineteenth-century psychologists such as William 
James. 82  Working in natural science-based, experimental disci-
plines, a broad range of scientists have come to a consensus, based 
on a vast amount and variety of data, that powerful unconscious 
mechanisms operate in the human brain to produce much human be-
havior, including many aspects social conduct.  
2. THE ROLE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
Over the past century, experimental findings have led research-
ers to become increasing convinced of the powerful role of the un-
conscious in even the most basic aspects of perception.83 Uncon-
scious processes organize the unmanageably complex data we re-
ceive through our senses—especially through our eyes—so as to al-
low us to make our surroundings intelligible.84 The brain does this 
so quickly and automatically that we are not aware of all the pro-
cessing that takes place before we can even start to make sense of 
our environment, both in its physical and social aspects.85 
As most relevant to social behavior, the elegant experimental 
work of two Israeli-born social psychologists, Dan Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, paved the way to the understandings scientists now 
possess about the social brain.86 Their work became popular in legal 
scholarship when Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for economics 
and published a best-selling book entitled Thinking, Fast and Slow87 
                                                                                                         
 81  See LEONARD MLODINOW, SUBLIMINAL: HOW YOUR UNCONSCIOUS MIND 
RULES YOUR BEHAVIOR 16–17, 33, 104 (2012); Keenan et al., supra note 79, at 
315. 
 82  MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 31−33. 
 83  For a recent accessible introduction into this research, see generally id.  
 84  Id. at 35. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Deborah Smith, Psychologist Wins Nobel Prize, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 
Dec. 2002, at 22, 22. 
 87  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
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after Tversky’s death in 1996.88  
Kahneman and Tversky discuss two distinct mental processes 
that operate in human thought.89  One, called “fast thinking,” is 
rapid, intuitive, and automatic, occurring “with little or no effort” or 
voluntary control.90 Kahneman adopted the label “System One” for 
this fast, intuitive system.91 The other, called “slow thinking,” in-
volves the attentive, deliberative, effortful, rational thought we typ-
ically associate with thinking.92 For this second, more ponderous 
and deliberative system, Kahneman adopted the label “System 
Two.”93 Most interesting to Kahneman in the operation of System 
One are the ways in which it preempts, aids, and often entirely sub-
stitutes for System Two.94 System One, as Kahneman explains, of-
ten performs brilliantly, allowing System Two to persist in its “in-
dolent” ways.95 
Kahneman and Tversky persuasively show that System One’s 
unconscious, automatic, and rapid thought is crucial to human func-
tioning in a host of ways, including social interaction.96 Yet, as they 
further demonstrate, the thought processes of System One are also 
error-prone and rife with many kinds of systematic biases. 97 
Through a description of a series of simple yet brilliant experiments, 
Kahneman and Tversky detect System One engaging in a wide range 
of irrational forms of decision-making.98 Just a few of these include 
“the marvels of priming,” where simply hearing a series of words 
may change one’s behavior without any awareness.99 For example, 
young adults asked to create sentences from the words “Florida, for-
getful, bald, grey or wrinkle,” later walk down a hallway more 
                                                                                                         
 88 Smith, supra note 86. 
 89  KAHNEMAN, supra note 87, at 20. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. at 20–21. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. at 21–28. 
 95  Id. at 417. 
 96  See id. at 21–28. 
 97  Id. at 25–28. 
 98  See id. at 53–54. 
 99  Id. 
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slowly than members of a control group do.100  
In another telling example, experimenters gave subjects the fol-
lowing description of a person named Linda:  
Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and 
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, 
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimina-
tion and social justice, and also participated in anti-
nuclear demonstrations.101 
The experimenters then asked the subjects to rank the probabil-
ity of a series of eight statements about Linda’s probable vocation, 
which included the statements, “Linda is a bank teller,” and “Linda 
is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.”102 By sur-
prising margins, subjects ranked the second statement as more prob-
able than the first, even though that decision is necessarily a logical 
fallacy because a statement with two conditions cannot be more 
probable than a statement with one. 103  This, Kahneman argues, 
shows how human beings, through the operation of heuristics, priv-
ilege “representativeness” over logic.104 Subjects focus intently on 
                                                                                                         
 100  Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted). Other features of System One thinking in-
clude a tendency to associate causal relationships between events that occur ran-
domly, id. at 74–77, and to “have intuitive feelings and opinions about almost 
everything that comes your way,” id. at 97. Examples of this latter tendency to-
ward intuitive snap judgments include liking or disliking strangers without know-
ing why, making predictions of success without analysis, answering questions one 
does not understand, and relying on evidence one cannot defend. Id. Another type 
involves illusions of memory or confabulation, through which people invent un-
true memories to fill in gaps in what they do remember, all with no awareness that 
they are doing so. See id. at 60–61; GREENE, supra note 61, at 299–30. Still other 
examples involve misperceiving risk levels and probabilities, jumping to conclu-
sions based on good stories rather than good evidence, and being wildly overcon-
fident in estimates of one’s abilities and level of control over events. KAHNEMAN, 
supra note 87, at 138, 209, 256. Experimental subjects similarly show irrational 
aversion to losses and the powerful influence of what psychologists call “the en-
dowment effect,” meaning that they place more value on things they currently 
own than things they do not yet possess. Id. at 292–99.  
 101  Id. at 156.  
 102  Id. at 156–57. 
 103  Id. at 157–58. The percentage of University of California undergraduate 
students who committed this error was eighty-nine percent (89%). Id. at 158. 
 104  See id. at 158–60. 
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the imagined whole of a person’s social identity based on just a few 
factual clues and assume that one fact about a person’s characteris-
tics necessarily predicts others, even though this logically is not 
true.105 
The force of Kahneman and Tversky’s work leaves little room 
for denying that illogical stereotypes and other faulty heuristics op-
erate frequently in human social thinking. Their work opened the 
way for much more experimentation on the nature of System One 
thought.106  At this point, the great weight of evidence, gathered 
through numerous scientific approaches, has confirmed the exist-
ence of fully unconscious, often illogically biased, System One pro-
cesses in social behavior.107 A host of studies from a wide variety of 
disciplines prove this fact.108  
Studies show that the human brain processes huge amounts of 
social information about human faces within milliseconds, even be-
                                                                                                         
 105  See id. at 157–58. 
 106  See Smith, supra note 86. 
 107  See Ezequiel Morsella & John A. Bargh, Unconscious Action Tendencies: 
Sources of “Un-Integrated” Action, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra 
note 29, at 335, 336–41. Some experiments testing for the existence of fully un-
conscious processes have produced astounding results. Neuroscientists have dis-
covered, for example, that persons with damaged optic nerves that render them 
unable to see can still accurately reach for objects placed before them. Id. at 337. 
Human beings who lack sight can categorize, at a statistically significant level of 
success, images of human faces that researchers put before them, even though 
they cannot see those images. See MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 40. Researchers 
“theorize” (in other words, speculate based on the available evidence) that even 
though the optic nerves of these subjects are not functioning, other parts of the 
social brain can still sense social identity. See id. at 40–41 (explaining this phe-
nomenon of “blindsight”).  
Experiments have also studied the way the social brain works unconsciously 
in more expectable ways. For example, human subjects can distinguish between 
the natural versus consciously induced smiles of strangers. WILSON, CONSILI-
ENCE, supra note 79, at 112. They can detect, without being able to say why, that 
someone is “untrustworthy,” which allows them to “avoid that person in future 
situations without needing to [constantly] re-evaluate all of our previous interac-
tions with the individual.” See William A. Cunningham et al., Attitudes, in SOCIAL 
NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 212, 212.  
 108  See, e.g., MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 40; WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra 
note 79, at 112. 
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fore experimental subjects are aware that they are looking at a hu-
man face.109 As another example, the processes by which human be-
ings quickly and intuitively grasp what other human beings are 
thinking, which researchers often refer to as “theory of mind,” ap-
pears to be substantially non-volitional and unconscious as well.110  
Similarly, the brain rapidly and automatically decides, prior to 
deliberative judgment, who is similar to oneself and who is not.111 
An enormous amount of research has documented that this uncon-
scious social brain makes automatic and non-volitional positive as-
sociations with persons perceived to be similar to the subject, based 
on even trivial similarities.112 To take another example, people reg-
ularly prefer other individuals who share their same birthday or first 
name.113 Researchers have found that people in most professions 
like members of their own profession significantly more than mem-
bers of other professions.114  
Well-replicated experiments in development psychology reveal 
that infants show a marked preference for their in-group members 
even in the first months of life, with babies looking preferentially—
or for a longer time—at persons who speak their native language 
well before they understand words.115 Another finding comes from 
the “ultimatum game” in experimental behavioral economics.116 
This classic experiment involves giving one player, called the pro-
poser, a sum of money, and then asking the proposer to offer to di-
                                                                                                         
 109  See ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR 
BEST AND WORST 85 (2017); see also Alexander Todorv, Evaluating Faces on 
Social Dimensions, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE 
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND 54, 54 (Alexander Todorov et al. eds., 
2011).  
 110  MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 86. 
 111  See id. at 86, 167–75.  
 112  Id. at 168. 
 113  See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE 
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 239 (2012). 
 114  See MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 167. The only exception are lawyers, 
who rate members of all professions at the same level of average likeability. Id. 
 115  WILSON, SOCIAL CONQUEST, supra note 80, at 60. 
 116  Saaid A. Mendoza et al., For Members Only: Ingroup Punishment of Fair-
ness Norm Violations in the Ultimatum Game, 5 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY 
SCI. 662, 663 (2014). 
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vide that sum between herself and another player, called the re-
sponder.117 The responder then chooses whether to accept or reject 
the proposal.118 If the responder accepts, the players split the money 
according to the proposer’s offer.119 If the responder rejects the pro-
posal, neither player receives any money.120 Experiments repeatedly 
find that proposers reward more money to responders who are arbi-
trarily designated as fellow in-group members than to responders 
who are identified as out-group members—even when an option is 
to award the money so that both groups end up with more.121 In other 
words, human focus on in-group likeness is so strong that it out-
weighs the classic economic assumption that individuals act to max-
imize self-interest.122  
Experiments in political science have similarly shown the effects 
of group identity on human judgment and political views.123 Exper-
iments have even shown that people perceive facts about the actions 
                                                                                                         
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Pascal Molenberghs, The Neuroscience of In-Group Bias, 37 NEUROSCI-
ENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 1530, 1531 (2013) (citing Henri Tajfel et al., 
Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 
173 (1971)).  
 122  See id. 
 123  See, e.g., JONAH BERGER, INVISIBLE INFLUENCE: THE HIDDEN FORCES 
THAT SHAPE BEHAVIOR 105–07 (2016). In one experiment, researchers showed 
subjects who identified as liberal Democrats a social policy that imposed stringent 
restrictions on welfare benefits. Id. at 106. These subjects liked the policy far more 
if experimenters told them that other Democrats liked it than they did if they did 
not have information about other Democrats’ views. Id. If the researchers told the 
subjects that Republicans liked the policy, the Democrats staunchly opposed it. 
Id. Conversely, Republicans liked generous welfare policies if told that other Re-
publicans liked them. Id. at 105. When asked why they held such views, both 
groups failed to recognize the influence of the members of their fellow in-
groups—i.e., those with the same political party affiliations. Id. at 106. Instead, 
they attributed their views to their own deliberative processes, thus demonstrating 
that one can be completely unconscious of the powerful effects of social influ-
ences. Id.  
Professor Berger further describes the ways in which product marketing takes 
advantage of people’s unconscious desires to use their product and lifestyle 
choices to signal their identity as members of particular kinds of groups. See id. 
at 122 (noting that some product choices, such as cars, signal identity more than 
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of political in-group members differently than facts about out-group 
members. In one classic experiment, researchers showed a video re-
cording of a controversial, roughly played football game between 
Princeton and Dartmouth Universities to students from the two 
schools.124 Students from Princeton counted Dartmouth players as 
having committed more fouls, whereas students from Dartmouth 
viewed the number of fouls committed by the two teams as equal.125 
In effect, the researchers explained, the two groups of students had 
viewed “a totally different game.”126  
Yale Law Professor Dan Kahan and his colleagues conducted a 
similar experiment where they tested how subjects viewed video 
clips of anti-abortion protests at clinics.127 The experiment found 
that subjects holding anti-abortion views saw protestors commit 
                                                                                                         
do others, such as choice of paper towels).  
Years before, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu undertook an investigation 
into how tastes in music, art, furniture, and other material objects signal one’s 
identity as members of various socio-economic classes. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, 
DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE 6–10, 70–72 
(Richard Nice trans., Routledge 2010) (1984).  
So too, policy makers have sought to use these research insights to encourage 
socially beneficial conduct. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 68 
(2008). For example, researchers found that informing people that their neighbors 
were conserving energy caused them to use less energy themselves. Id. at 68–69 
(noting, additionally, that when households were informed that they were using 
less energy than their neighbors, they increased their energy use). Nobel laureate 
behavioral economist Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, a law professor who 
worked on these ideas as Administrator of the White House Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs under President Obama, utilized these insights in the writ-
ing of Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Cass 
R. Sunstein, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10871/Sun-
stein (last visited Mar. 23, 2019); Richard H. Thaler, U. CHIC. BOOTH SCH. BUS., 
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/t/richard-h-thaler (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2019). 
 124  Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 129–30 (1954). 
 125  Id. at 130, 132. 
 126  Molenberghs, supra note 121, at 1532 (citing Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 
124, at 132).  
 127  Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the 
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 864 (2012).  
 
2019] ACTING DIFFERENTLY 679 
fewer illegal acts than did subjects who favored access to abor-
tion.128  
These effects occur even when groups are newly created. In an-
other example, experimenters randomly divided participants into a 
“red” group and a “blue” group and then asked them to watch video 
clips to determine which team’s members pushed a button faster.129 
The experimenters had constructed the video clips so that the two 
groups were exactly equivalent on this measure.130 Each team, how-
ever, judged members of their own team as faster.131 Another exper-
iment found that people are more willing to donate money to in-
group members as opposed to out-group members who are in dis-
tress.132  
Neuroscientists have sought to study the brain processes in-
volved favoring in-group members through brain imaging stud-
ies.133 They found that people’s brains are more active when they 
perceive members of their in-group being subjected to painful stim-
uli.134 Images of in-group members suffering pain activate the parts 
of the brain that appear to be associated with feeling empathy, 
whereas images of out-group members’ suffering can trigger areas 
that appear to be connected with pleasure and schadenfreude.135 In 
these studies of empathic response, “ethnic identification was the 
largest predictor for in-group favoritism.”136 
Neuroscientists currently believe that the brain processes in-
volved in in-group versus out-group categorization are related to the 
parts of the brain that process self-identity.137 Along with other psy-
chologists, neuroscientists theorize that people assign more positive 
feelings and higher social status to in-group members than to out-
                                                                                                         
 128  See id. at 884 (finding that individuals who saw an identical video of abor-
tion protesters reached different conclusions about what they saw based on their 
cultural values).  
 129  Molenberghs, supra note 121, at 1532. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id.  
 132  Id. at 1533. 
 133  See, e.g., id. at 1532–33. 
 134  Id. at 1533. 
 135  Id.  
 136  Id. 
 137  Id. at 1531–32; Samantha Morrison et al., The Neuroscience of Group 
Membership, 50 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 2114, 2115 (2012).  
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group members.138 Individuals produce positive self-esteem by as-
signing high social status to themselves and their identity group.139 
In other words, a process of distinguishing “us” from “them” ap-
pears to create both self-identity and self-esteem.140  Researchers 
term this concept Social Identity Theory.141  
The powerful non-volitional processes of constructing and lo-
cating one’s self-identity in relation to in-groups and out-groups has 
important functions in social behavior. Evolutionary biologists pos-
tulate that these processes offered important evolutionary ad-
vantages, leading persons to be on guard against the potential dan-
gers outsiders might pose.142 But one need not subscribe to evolu-
tion-based theories to accept the robust findings that humans do in-
deed categorize others into identity groups. From a functionalist so-
cial science viewpoint too, powerful, automatic, and non-volitional 
feelings of loyalty toward fellow in-group members produce the 
benefits of in-group coherence and cooperation, as well as compet-
itive fever to excel and win.143 From this perspective, the social 
brain’s differentiation between in-groups and out-groups has im-
portant advantages, facilitating humans working in groups and 
thereby developing cultures and other collective achievements.144  
These same unconscious and non-volitional processes also have 
                                                                                                         
 138  See Molenberghs, supra note 121, at 1532. 
 139  Id. 
 140  See id. 
 141  Morrison et al., supra note 137, at 2115. Social identity theory proposes 
that individuals take on the positive identifications associated with the groups to 
which they belong and that this process is important to positive self-development. 
See Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg, Social Identification, Self-Categoriza-
tion and Social Influence, 1 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 196 (1990) (discuss-
ing social identity and self-categorization theory and tracing its intellectual roots 
to Tajfel and other classic social psychologists).  
 142  See HAIDT, supra note 113, at 238. 
 143  Cf. MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 172 (noting that companies such as Dis-
ney, Apple, and Google strive to create a strong corporate culture but recognizing 
that problems can arise when a company’s internal departments develop strong 
group identities that cause in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination).  
 144  See HAIDT, supra note 113, at 204, 233. 
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suboptimal side effects in contemporary conditions of social plural-
ism.145 In modern societies, fighting among social groups is often 
counterproductive.146 Indeed, when protected characteristics are at 
issue, such as race, gender, national origin, religion, disability, and 
age—all characteristics that tend to be salient to individuals’ social 
identity today—favoring one’s in-group and disfavoring the con-
trasting out-group constitutes the very definition of unlawful dis-
crimination.147 
At the extreme, the social construction of out-groups leads to 
dehumanization148—in other words, the construction of human be-
ings as less than human. 149  As social psychologists have docu-
mented, this type of process occurred in the world’s many incidents 
of mass atrocities and genocide, where members of some groups 
murder members of other groups as a result of constructing their 
group identity in hostile opposition to that of the out-group. Exam-
ples include the Rwandan genocide,150 the genocide in Darfur,151 the 
Nazi Holocaust,152 and Cambodia’s killing fields,153 to name just a 
few. Social neuroscientists have begun to study the neural processes 
involved in these atrocities.154 Researchers have found that when 
                                                                                                         
 145  In GREENE, supra note 61, at 19–27, Joshua Greene makes this point pow-
erfully.  
 146  See id. 
 147  See supra notes 41–44. 
 148  Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: 
Neuroimaging Response to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 848 
(2006).  
 149  In Spanish, the term for dehumanization is cosificación. As the Spanish 
word for “thing” is cosa, cosificación literally translates to “turning into a thing.” 
See Cosaficar, COLLINS DICTIONARY: ESPAÑOL – INGLÉS ENGLISH – SPANISH (4th 
ed. 2002).  
 150  SAPOLSKY, supra note 109, at 571–72 (discussing the Hutu genocide of 
Tutsis in Rwanda from the perspective of a social neuroscientist).  
 151  See REBECCA HAMILTON, FIGHTING FOR DARFUR: PUBLIC ACTION AND 
THE STRUGGLE TO STOP GENOCIDE 16–25 (2011) (discussing the genocide in Dar-
fur and the failure of international activists’ efforts to halt it).  
 152  See SAUL FRIEDLANDER, THE YEARS OF EXTERMINATION: NAZI GERMANY 
AND THE JEWS, 1939–1945 (2007) (describing the Nazi Holocaust). 
 153  See CRAIG ETCHESON, AFTER THE KILLING FIELDS: LESSONS FROM THE 
CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE (2005) (detailing the atrocities committed by the Khmer 
Rouge). 
 154  See, e.g., Harris & Fiske, supra note 148, at 848. 
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subjects are shown images of extreme outgroups—such as drug ad-
dicts and homeless people—the parts of the brain that trigger think-
ing about other human beings are not triggered at all.155 Instead, 
when experimenters showed images of members of these groups to 
experimental subjects, the images activated regions of the brain as-
sociated with disgust.156 These findings support other evidence that 
humans sometimes perceive out-group members as less than human, 
corresponding with Erving Goffman’s classic and influential work 
on stigma and dehumanization,157 which I will discuss further in 
Section I.C.3 below. In sum, the automatic neural processes that pro-
duce in- versus out-group thinking have benefits and pitfalls. The 
same processes that produce human sociability, including group loy-
alty, cohesion, and the desire to pitch in and help, also produce the 
downsides of out-group hostility and derogation.  
This Part has surveyed experimental research from a variety of 
disciplines, including not only behavioral economics but also polit-
ical science, social psychology, game theory, and similar fields. Yet 
even though the underlying processes of the unconscious social 
brain are essentially the same across the realms of politics, econom-
ics, and social relations, scholars allied with different disciplines 
sometimes fail to appreciate that their work flows from the same 
fundamental discovery of the unconscious social brain. Conserva-
tive legal scholars who enthusiastically appreciate Kahneman and 
Tversky’s work, for example, tend to dismiss the research on im-
plicit bias, even though it all flows from the same foundation.158 
This Article stands as a call for scholars to abandon these discipli-
nary and political silos—which are, after all, just another type of us 
versus them thinking. 
B.  Underappreciated Social Neuroscience Insights 
With a short introduction to the social neuroscience study of the 
                                                                                                         
 155  Id. at 847–48. 
 156  Id. at 850.  
 157  ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED 
IDENTITY 5 (1963).  
 158  See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New 
Narrative 4–5, 18 (Aug. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholar-
ship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2558&context=faculty_publica-
tions. 
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neural workings of in-group favoritism now out of the way, we are 
ready to turn to this interdisciplinary field’s most well-known find-
ings as relevant to antidiscrimination law—namely, the multitude of 
studies on unconscious bias. Social scientists widely accept the sci-
ence underlying implicit bias testing (or implicit association testing, 
“IAT”), which they have replicated across many studies, disciplines, 
nations, and group conditions.159 Antidiscrimination theorists have 
recognized that these studies have much to offer legal theorists’ un-
derstanding of discrimination.160 But the uncontestable facts about 
the existence of unconscious bias only scratch the surface of what 
social neuroscience can teach legal antidiscrimination theorists. Be-
low, I present two examples of insights from implicit bias studies 
that legal theorists should further pursue.  
1. DETECTING IMPLICIT BIAS IS NOT (COMPLETELY) A BAD THING, 
AT LEAST AS COMPARED TO THE ALTERNATIVE  
To study the phenomenon of bias that arises from the brain’s 
processes of social categorization, researchers have developed 
methods for measuring degrees of bias.161 Researchers have used a 
method that incorporates the “Stroop task.”162 The Stroop task most 
often consists of requiring participants to name the ink color of a 
written color word.163 The task is most mentally taxing when the ink 
color of the word is different from the color the word spells out, for 
example, requiring the participant to identify that the word “pink” is 
in the ink color “blue.”164 The method measures bias by calling on 
participants to perform the Stroop task after a task that activates the 
                                                                                                         
 159  See Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social 
Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 298–
99 (2003) (recognizing that there has been a surge of interest in the use of implicit 
bias tests in social psychology research). 
 160  See, e.g., Tanya Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases–The Implicit Association Test Research as Social 
Framework Evidence, 32 L. & INEQ. 309, 310–12 (2014). 
 161  See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra note 107, at 219–20. 
 162  Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of 
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1141 
n.154 (2004); see also Overview, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.har-
vard.edu/implicit/education.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).  
 163  See Cunningham et al., supra note 107, at 220. 
 164  Id. 
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automatic neural systems involved in out-group prejudice, such as 
viewing faces of inviduals of different races.165 Studies consistently 
show that participants take longer to perform the Stroop task when 
their mental processes are dealing with the burden of trying to coun-
ter their implicit biases.166 The longer the delay, scientists assume, 
the greater the force of the automatic processes involved in implicit 
bias that the subject is working to suppress.167  
Results show that most experimental subjects have a statistically 
significant slower response time when asked to associate positive 
ideas or words with words, images, or faces associated with out-
groups.168 In the United States, for example, subjects show slower 
response times in connecting positive associations with persons be-
longing to racial minorities.169 Members of racial minority groups 
on average show some bias against other members of their own 
groups, although this negative bias toward fellow minorities is typ-
ically less severe for members asked to rate members of their own 
groups than for dominant race persons asked to rate members of 
other groups. 170  Among the dominant racial group—i.e., in the 
United States, among whites—a wide range of implicit bias scores 
exists.171 Average scores vary by region of the country as well as 
other variables.172  
Reaction time testing is most often aimed at measuring bias 
                                                                                                         
 165  See id.  
 166  See, e.g., id. (describing multiple studies using the Stroop task). 
 167  See id. 
 168  See, e.g., Charles W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization 
and the Process of Intergroup Bias, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 475, 
477–79 (1990).  
 169  See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences 
in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1464, 1473–76 (1998) (finding that whites respond more slowly to 
“pro-Black” examples).  
 170  See, e.g., David S. March & Reiko Graham, Exploring Implicit Ingroup 
and Outgroup Bias Toward Hispanics, 18 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RE-
LATIONS 89, 95–100 (2014). 
 171  See Chris Mooney, Across America, Whites Are Biased and They Don’t 
Even Know It, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/08/across-america-whites-are-biased-and-they-dont-
even-know-it/?utm_term=.dccd4d399ccc. 
 172  See id. (providing a regional map showing states with different measured 
levels of implicit bias). 
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based on race and ethnicity (and gender, though gender will not be 
my focus here).173 Many legal scholars have pointed to implicit bias 
research to explain why decision-makers take adverse employment 
actions against traditionally excluded outsiders despite their con-
scious efforts to act with good will and without prejudice.174 IAT 
thus helps explain the statistics showing that employment discrimi-
nation persists despite a half-century’s prohibition. 175  However, 
IAT solely proves the existence of unconscious bias; it does not in 
itself explain why such bias occurs.176 
Researchers have sought to explain the processes in the brain 
that account for IAT results.177 What seems important, according to 
a group of experts who recently summarized this literature, is that 
subjects have formed the goal of avoiding racial or other bias in their 
decision-making.178 This is because the IAT measures the efforts of 
the brain to suppress prejudiced thoughts that the subject does not 
want to have.179 The delay in response time reflects the brain’s ef-
fortful work to suppress stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes—what 
                                                                                                         
 173  See, e.g., Hernández, supra note 160, at 322. 
 174  See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce et al., Difference Blindness vs. Bias Awareness: 
Why Law Firms with the Best of Intentions Have Failed to Create Diverse Part-
nerships, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2407, 2407–08, 2422–25 (2015) (describing a 
study that found that elite law firm partners gave significantly higher evaluations 
to identical memoranda when they were told they had been drafted by white as-
sociates than when they were told that the associates were black, despite their 
firms’ generally good intentions to promote equity and inclusion for people out-
side the dominant racial group).  
 175  See, e.g., Leora F. Eisenstadt & Jeffrey R. Boles, Intent and Liability in 
Employment Discrimination, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 608–10 (2016) (applying the 
lessons of implicit association testing to analyze the state of employment discrim-
ination law); Hernández, supra note 160, at 310–12 (arguing that courts and leg-
islatures should consider implicit bias a reason for reforming doctrinal standards); 
Pearce et al., supra note 174, at 2441 (finding that lawyers bring their implicit 
biases to their work). In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 176  Hernández, supra note 160, at 321–22. 
 177  See Dylan D. Wagner et al., Staying in Control: The Neural Basis of Self-
Regulation and Its Failure, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 29, 
at 360, 369. 
 178  See id. at 369; Cunningham et al., supra note 107, at 220. 
 179  See Wagner et al., supra note 177, at 369. 
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neuroscientists call “cognitive control.”180 The IAT measures how 
much cognitive control subjects are exerting.181 Subjects with a high 
drive not to be, or at least appear, prejudiced engage in cognitive 
control to suppress prejudiced thoughts, and because they are doing 
so, their response times are slower.  
But, people who do not have a high drive to appear non-preju-
diced—in other words, people who feel free to feel and express neg-
ative stereotypes about out-groups—engage in less cognitive con-
trol.182 Read this way, the oft-replicated results of IAT testing are 
actually something of a good sign. This is because the only alterna-
tive to finding evidence of effortful cognitive control to resist im-
plicit bias in judgments about out-groups is less effort at cognitive 
control, which corresponds to less of a goal-directed drive to avoid 
being prejudiced. Put more plainly, a person who demonstrates im-
plicit bias is better than a blatant bigot. As I will discuss further in 
Part II below, these conclusions lead to important doctrinal and pol-
icy insights.  
2. RACISM DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE “HARD WIRED” INTO THE 
HUMAN BRAIN  
A conclusion people may reach when they learn about implicit 
bias testing is that racism must be “hard wired” into the brain.183 
However, this is a misconception. As leading evolutionary biolo-
gists point out, the notion that racism arose as a byproduct of human 
evolution rests on a logical and scientific fallacy.184 What human 
                                                                                                         
 180  Id. at 368–69. 
 181  Id. at 369. 
 182  Id.; see also Todd F. Heatherton & Dylan D. Wagner, Cognitive Neurosci-
ence of Self-Regulation Failure, 15 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 132, 132–37 (2011) 
(explaining why cognitive control fails).  
 183  See Rob Waugh, Racism Is ‘Hardwired’ into the Human Brain - and Peo-
ple Can Be Prejudiced Without Knowing It, DAILY MAIL (June 26, 2012, 6:33 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2164844/Racism-hard-
wired-human-brain--people-racists-knowing-it.html (asserting that “[r]acism is 
hardwired into the brain”). But see Are We Hard-Wired to Be Racist?, NPR (Dec. 
4, 2008, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
97802442 (discussing that stereotypes and associations can be changed). 
 184  Gianfranco Biondi & Olga Rickards, The Scientific Fallacy of the Human 
Biological Concept of Race, 42 MANKIND Q. 355, 374–78 (2002) (arguing that 
race is not a byproduct of human evolution). 
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brains are sensitive to and prone to hostility about is not skin color 
or facial features per se, but any relevant socially constructed differ-
ence.185 According to evolutionary biologists, it makes no logical 
sense to propose that evolution hard wired the human brain to re-
spond negatively to phenotypic differences because, during the vast 
span of humans’ evolutionary history, during which group survival 
influenced the evolution of the human brain, our ancient ancestors 
typically would not have encountered persons of different races.186 
This relevant period, natural scientists point out, stretches back more 
than 60,000 years.187 The differences that were salient to group sur-
vival in this very long-ago evolutionary past involved linguistic and 
other cultural differences among neighboring groups that were phe-
notypically very similar.188  
To evolutionary biologists, this typical lack of interaction with 
people of different races in the long arc of evolutionary history sug-
gests why human brains are so extremely sensitive in noticing any 
socially salient difference.189 What differences are relevant depends 
on socially constructed meanings that vary widely across time and 
place.190 On this theory, System One processes in the brain notice 
and react to subtle social differences that, in very old evolutionary 
                                                                                                         
 185  Cf. HAIDT, supra note 113, at 239 (arguing that to create a cohesive group 
one should make racial differences less relevant by highlighting other similarities 
in the group). 
 186  See GREENE, supra note 61, at 52 (“[O]ne would expect the human mind’s 
social sorting system . . . [to sort] people based on culturally acquired character-
istics, such as language and clothing, rather than genetically inherited physical 
features.”); HAIDT, supra note 113, at 239 (“There’s nothing special about race.”); 
SAPOLSKY, supra note 109, at 407 (pointing out that “there is no evolutionary 
legacy of humans encountering people of markedly different skin color”).  
 187  See MARK PAGEL, WIRED FOR CULTURE: ORIGINS OF THE HUMAN SOCIAL 
MIND 48 (2012) (explaining that modern humans left Africa 60,000 to 70,000 
years ago and spread far apart). Of course, the timeline for evolution of Homo 
sapiens stretches back far longer, as predecessor hominid species evolved to pro-
duce Homo sapiens.  
 188  Id. at 49–54 (discussing the great density of language differences among 
pre-modern societies); GREENE, supra note 61, at 52. 
 189  See, e.g., PAGEL, supra note 187, at 57. 
 190  See Biondi & Rickards, supra note 184, at 374–78. 
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terms, allowed group members to make quick determinations imper-
ative to their survival.191 System One decides whether other peo-
ple’s behavior exhibits markers that they are probably safe as fellow 
in-group members or, in the alternative, may be potentially danger-
ous members of an out-group.192  
Experimental psychology research supports evolutionary biolo-
gists’ view. For example, experiments have shown that subjects stop 
noticing race (but not gender)193 when they are told that a character-
istic other than race is the important marker differentiating members 
of their in-group from an out-group.194 Thus, subjects shown a series 
of photos and asked to remember faces noticed race when not given 
another classification criteria.195 When researchers gave a different 
group the same set of photos and told them that the players wearing 
gray were the members of their team and the players wearing yellow 
were the members of the opposing team, these subjects remembered 
the color of players’ uniforms rather than their race.196  
C.  The Creation of In- Versus Out-Groups 
The research I have described thus far examines the evidence 
that the social brain has unconscious tendencies to construct inferior 
“others” and engage in discrimination against them. This Section 
delves more deeply into what empirical researchers (as opposed to 
speculative evolutionary psychologists) currently understand about 
                                                                                                         
 191  Michael J. Manfredo et al., Considerations in Representing Human Indi-
viduals in Social-Ecological Models, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES: FORGING NEW STRANDS OF INTEGRATION ACROSS THE SOCIAL SCI-
ENCES 137, 140 (Michael J. Manfredo et al. eds., 2014). 
 192  See id. 
 193  Evolutionary biologists argue that the brain continues to notice gender be-
cause gender had an important role in evolution. See, e.g., GREENE, supra note 
61, at 53 (discussing Robert Kurzban et al., Can Race Be Erased? Coalitional 
Computation and Social Categorization, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15,387 
(2001)); see also WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 79, at 170 (“The optimum 
sexual instinct of men . . . is to be assertive and ruttish, while that of women is to 
be coy and selective.”). Evolutionary biologists provoke feminists’ ire (including 
mine) when they assert the naturalness of sex-based differences, but this topic is 
too complex to take on in the limited space of this Article.  
 194  Kurzban et al., supra note 193, at 15,391; see also GREENE, supra note 61, 
at 53 (discussing Kurzban et al., supra note 193, and other studies).  
 195  Kurzban et al., supra note 193, at 15,388–89. 
 196  Id. at 15,389. 
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why such “us versus them” thinking takes place.  
Humans show an immense capacity to work cooperatively, on 
one hand, yet view some people as outsiders with whom they do not 
want to cooperate, on the other. Social scientists believe that these 
two tendencies are flip sides of the same coin: Defining some per-
sons as outsiders helps one to construct a group of insiders—i.e., 
people one trusts and wants to cooperate with to accomplish collec-
tive ends. Psychologists further believe that preferring one’s fellow 
in-group members helps cement one’s grasp of the social and be-
havioral norms one should strive to apply to oneself. Group mem-
bers want to be like, or conform to, others in their in-group. An im-
portant part of social psychologists’ study of social behavior has in-
volved investigating the neural underpinnings of this desire to con-
form. 
1. CONFORMITY  
We see humans’ desire to conform to the expectations of their 
in-groups every day in social settings.197 We experience it within 
ourselves on a constant basis.198 Yet social neuroscience discovered 
how this tendency to imitate others occurs at a neural level only 
fairly recently, and then by accident.199 According to the oft-told 
story, 200 this discovery occurred as Italian neurologists were con-
ducting brain scans on macaque monkeys.201 A graduate student en-
tered the room eating an ice cream cone.202 To the scientists’ sur-
prise, parts of the monkey’s brain that activate for planning and ini-
tiating its own movement started firing as the monkey watched the 
graduate student eat.203 Investigating further, the scientists discov-
ered that the same parts of the monkey’s brain activated when it 
watched somebody pick up a banana and when it picked up a banana 
itself.204 These observations led the scientists to propose the exist-
ence of what have come to be popularly termed “mirror neurons,” 
                                                                                                         
 197  See BERGER, supra note 123, at 27–28. 
 198  Id. 
 199  See id. at 33–35. 
 200  Id. 
 201  Id. at 33–34. 
 202  Id. at 34. 
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which encourage the brain to perform behaviors it sees others do-
ing.205  
After first discovering mirror neurons in monkey brains, neuro-
scientists found something like them in human brains as well.206 To-
day, research documents that human brains, like those of nonhuman 
primates, “automatically imitate the postures, facial expressions, 
emotional expressions, and speaking styles of others.”207  
Experiments in social psychology and behavioral economics 
have shown that the tendencies to imitate others facilitate coopera-
tion; for example, behavioral mimicry greatly increases the chance 
that people in negotiations will reach a deal.208 Scientists thus be-
lieve that the unconscious System One tendency of primate brains 
toward imitation “increase[s] liking and bonding between the indi-
viduals—serving as a kind of natural ‘social glue.’”209 Imitation is 
an automatic process of the social brain that signals likeness, i.e., the 
fact that I act like you shows “that we have things in common or are 
part of the same tribe,”210 which in turn facilitates cooperation and 
agreement.  
The study of group conformity has long roots in the intellectual 
history of experimental social psychology. A bit of backtracking 
will pay off in illuminating the basis for more contemporary work. 
The reader already familiar with or less interested in this intellectual 
history can skip ahead to Section I.C.1.ii. 
i. Classic Studies 
Turkish-born social psychologist Muzafer Sherif conducted 
some of the first experiments on group conformity.211 Known for his 
ingenious experimental designs, Sherif completed his dissertation, 
entitled Some Social Factors in Perception, at Columbia University 
                                                                                                         
 205  Id. at 35. 
 206  Id.  
 207  Morsella & Bargh, supra note 107, at 341.  
 208  BERGER, supra note 123, at 40–41. 
 209  Morsella & Bargh, supra note 107, at 341. 
 210  BERGER, supra note 123, at 41.  
 211  Aysel Kayaoğlu et al., The Unknown Muzafer Sherif, BRITISH PSYCHOL. 
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zafer-sherif (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
 
2019] ACTING DIFFERENTLY 691 
in 1935.212 A key experiment involved bringing subjects in groups 
of two or three into a darkened room, where they together watched 
a small dot of light shining on a wall.213 The light remained station-
ary, but continuing to stare at the light made it appear to move, a 
phenomenon known as the auto-kinetic effect.214 The experimenter 
instructed the participants to estimate aloud how far the light was 
moving.215 Sherif showed that with repeated trials the subjects con-
verged on similar estimates about the distance covered by the mo-
tion of the light.216 Between groups, the estimates varied widely, but 
within groups they became very similar over repetitions.217 This, 
Sherif proposed, reflected the development of a social norm—i.e., a 
shared intra-group understanding of facts about the world—even 
though these agreed-upon “facts” had no actual basis in the physical 
world.218  
To further test whether differential group norms would endure 
outside the pressure of being in a group, Sherif invited his subjects 
back on another day to repeat the experiment.219 This time he put 
each participant in the darkened room alone to watch the dot of 
light.220 Sherif found that members of groups that had estimated 
short distances for the light’s movement continued to estimate short 
distances when watching the light alone, and members of groups 
that had previously estimated longer distances continued to estimate 
longer distances, even though they were now outside the influence 
of their groups.221 Sherif thus proposed that individuals retain group 
perceptions even when they are no longer with the group.222  
Another important early social psychologist, Solomon Asch, as-
cribed his interest in social conformity to his personal connections 
                                                                                                         
 212  See id. 
 213  See MUZAFER SHERIF, PUB. NO. 187, A STUDY OF SOCIAL FACTORS IN PER-
CEPTION 17–18, 28 (R.S. Woodworth ed., 1935). 
 214  Id. at 18. 
 215  Id. at 23. 
 216  Id. at 30. 
 217  Id. at 31. 
 218  See id. at 25. 
 219  See id. at 30. 
 220  Id. at 27–28. 
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to the Holocaust as a Polish Jew.223 Asch took Sherif’s inquiry fur-
ther. The auto-kinetic effect involved an ambiguous phenomenon, 
but Asch wanted to investigate group influence on matters of ob-
servable fact that were unambiguously true or false.224 To do this, 
Asch asked small groups of experimental subjects to match lines of 
varying lengths.225 All of the members of the group, except one, 
were in league with the experimenter and had been instructed to state 
incorrectly which lines corresponded in length.226 In the groups, 
each participant was instructed to state his answer aloud and the “na-
ïve” subject (i.e., the one who was not conspiring with the experi-
menter) was always asked to give his answer last.227 
Asch found that over repeated trials approximately one third of 
the naïve subjects conformed their answers to the incorrect answers 
given by the others in the group.228 Approximately three quarters of 
the participants conformed incorrectly at least once (meaning that 
one fourth never conformed).229 In contrast, in a control group, in 
which different participants were asked to judge individually which 
lengths of lines matched, only five percent (5%) ever got the an-
swers wrong.230  
Asch’s experiment showed that people conform to group ideas 
even when they contradict objective facts. Subsequent experiments 
modelled after Asch’s added new neuroscience technologies to 
measure participants’ conformity to wrong group answers on a task 
that involved mentally manipulating a three-dimensional image.231 
These experiments produced the same results: a substantial percent-
age of the subjects (though not all) conformed to objectively wrong 
answers at least some of the time.232  
                                                                                                         
 223  GREGORY BERNS, ICONOCLAST: A NEUROSCIENTIST REVEALS HOW TO 
THINK DIFFERENTLY 92 (2008). 
 224  See id. at 89–91. 
 225  Id. at 89–90. 
 226  Id. at 89. 
 227  See id. 89–91. 
 228  Id. at 91. 
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 231  Id. at 93–94. 
 232  Id. at 96 (discussing Asch’s and more contemporary experiments). 
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By the 1960s, experimental psychologists had entered into a pe-
riod in which their research preoccupations and experimental meth-
odologies had changed considerably from the dominant styles of the 
1950s.233 Rather than continuing to test perceptions of the physical 
world, some social psychologists turned their attention to testing 
group conformity in situations raising moral imperatives.234 Stanley 
Milgram of Yale University conducted the most famous of these ex-
periments, in work that continues to be taught in ethics and psychol-
ogy classes to this day.235  
Like Asch, Milgram came from an American Jewish family and 
attributed his interest in group influence to having met relatives who 
suffered in Nazi death camps.236 While investigating group con-
formity, Milgram discovered that individuals obeyed authority even 
when they were not in a group.237 In the summer of 1960, during the 
trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, Milgram 
developed an experimental design that he hoped would test the ex-
tent to which ordinary people would obey commands from an au-
thority to do something as morally wrong as inflicting severe pain 
on other people simply because they were ordered to do so.238  
The results of the Milgram experiment have been replicated 
many times in many settings around the world.239 In Milgram’s ex-
periment, test subjects designated as “teachers” followed the exper-
imenters’ instructions to deliver to a person cast as a “learner” what 
                                                                                                         
 233  See THOMAS BLASS, THE MAN WHO SHOCKED THE WORLD: THE LIFE AND 
LEGACY OF STANLEY MILGRAM 118–19 (2004). 
 234  Id. at 42–43, 62, 118–20. 
 235  Cari Romm, Rethinking One of Psychology’s Most Infamous Experiments, 
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appeared to be increasingly severe electric shocks.240 Sixty-five per-
cent (65%) of the “teachers” continued to increase the shock dial far 
beyond the level marked as painful or dangerous, turning the dial all 
the way up to the top voltage possible, before which point the 
learner’s screams of pain had been replaced with ominous silence.241 
Many “teachers” protested and complained or expressed extreme 
discomfort in obeying the experimenters’ commands to keep going, 
but followed the instructions nevertheless.242 All teachers adminis-
tered some level of shocks to the learners, but thirty-five percent 
(35%) refused to continue at some point in the experiment.243  
When Milgram varied the conditions of his experiment, he found 
that moving it from the campus of Yale to a run-down office build-
ing in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and casting it as an experiment of a 
private research firm lowered the rate of compliance somewhat, but 
not to a statistically significant degree.244 A key variable that low-
ered rates of compliance was the presence of other subjects who re-
fused to deliver the shocks.245 The presence of two dissenters low-
ered compliance rates to ten percent (10%).246 
Milgram’s experiment remains the best-known and most vivid 
                                                                                                         
 240  ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 271. 
 241  See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & 
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demonstration of humans’ tendency to go along with others, but it 
is not the only one.247 Other examples, too, demonstrate the strong 
effects of what has come to be called “groupthink,” as I discuss fur-
ther below.248 
                                                                                                         
 247  Other experiments found that pilots and nurses followed obviously incor-
rect instructions at shockingly high rates, pointing to significant public safety con-
cerns. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 277–78 (describing studies of pilots and 
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  The experimenters, who became dismayed at the extent of the intergroup 
hostility they had engineered, then involved the two groups in new activities that 
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They told both groups, for example, that the vehicle they needed for transportation 
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these activities did the boys’ animosity toward members of their respective out-
groups somewhat subside. Id. at 188.  
  Another classic field experiment designed to trigger the negative features 
of human group identification involved social psychologist Phillip Zimbardo’s 
1971 Stanford Prison Experiment. See Setting Up, STAN. PRISON EXPERIMENT, 
http://www.prisonexp.org/setting-up (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (presenting a 
website about this experiment). Zimbardo recruited two dozen Stanford college 
students for a week-long residential experiment acting in the roles of guards and 
prisoners and found that the “guards” quickly began engaging in abusive behavior 
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ii. Contemporary Research 
Today no research review board would permit experiments on 
human subjects as intense as the Milgram experiment.249 His work 
raises too many ethical issues, especially in causing trauma to un-
witting participants asked to engage in morally problematic con-
duct.250 Experimenters no longer can so easily explore ordinary peo-
ple’s capacity for conforming to immoral directives, but research on 
conformity continues, using the research methods of a different era.  
Studies in business and social psychology, for example, docu-
ment how conformity and a desire for interpersonal harmony can 
cause groups to make suboptimal decisions.251 Asch discovered this 
phenomenon decades ago when he showed that people tend to con-
form to the views first expressed in a group, even when those views 
are objectively wrong.252 The contemporary literature emphasizes 
that organizations and groups tend to reach better results if they en-
courage dissent and independent thinking and oppose “groupthink” 
dynamics.253  
The following example is representative of the results of many 
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scribing the guards verbal and sometimes even physical abuse of those in the pris-
oner role). Zimbardo has published little of his data and it has not been subject to 
peer review. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 109, at 466–67 (noting problems with the 
scientific standards under which both the Stanford and Milgram studies were con-
ducted).  
 249  See THOMAS BLASS, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 
ON MILGRAM PARADIGM 211 (2000). 
 250  See id. 
 251  See BERGER, supra note 123, at 58. 
 252  Id. at 58–59 (making this point about Asch’s findings in his line-length 
experiment); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 38–39 (2004).  
 253  SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 29–31, 36–39 (noting experiments finding 
that diversity of thinking in groups greatly improves the accuracy of collective 
outcomes, but only if participants are each required to think independently rather 
than subject to group influences); see Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes 
Us Smarter, SCI. AM. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti-
cle/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/ (summarizing the leading literature on the 
benefits of diversity).  
 
2019] ACTING DIFFERENTLY 697 
experiments: When individuals in a group are each asked inde-
pendently to guess the number of objects in a jar, the average of all 
their guesses will be more accurate than that of ninety-seven percent 
(97%) of the individuals guessing separately.254 This holds true only 
if the individuals are not influenced by others’ guesses, however; if 
participants have been influenced by learning what others think, 
they will tend toward the group consensus and the improved accu-
racy will be lost255 (consistent with Sherif’s early experiments dis-
cussed in Section I.C.1.i above). The expertise and intelligence of 
the individuals in the group are not what matters; the independent 
diversity of their opinions is what does.256 
Social neuroscience adds another layer to this knowledge. In a 
version of the image rotation experiment described in Section I.C.1.i 
above, researcher Gregory Berns brought naïve participants into 
contact with the experiment’s “confederates” in a waiting room.257 
The experimenters encouraged the participants to bond by playing 
computer games together and taking photos of each other.258 The 
experimenters then chose naïve participants and confederates to 
look together at images of rotated 3D objects to determine whether 
they were the same or different.259 The confederates were instructed 
to give wrong answers in some trials and correct answers in oth-
ers.260 The researchers found that the naïve participants were far 
more likely to give wrong answers after they heard other people give 
wrong answers.261  
Research on this phenomenon of groupthink underlies the call in 
organizational management literature for diversity—not only on 
race, national origin, gender and other social identity lines, but also 
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in a host of ways that allow groups to benefit from the wide variation 
in human abilities, perspectives, personalities and experiences. The 
cumulative weight of this research offers one of many sources of 
experimental data that supports recognizing a human right to act dif-
ferently, as I will discuss further in Section II.B below.262  
The research on groupthink further shows that the tendency to 
conform comes not only from the automatic brain processes that 
positively encourage imitation and a desire to please others, but also 
from powerful negative influences on the brain. These negative ef-
fects involve the brain’s reaction to the experience of social rejec-
tion. This phenomenon of “social pain” has been the subject of a 
growing literature that deserves more attention in the legal literature, 
as I discuss below.  
2. SOCIAL PAIN 
In brief, neuroscience shows that humans experience social re-
jection and exclusion as profoundly painful, even when it is rela-
tively minor in scope or consequence to the individual affected.263 
Public health studies, as well as the field of epigenetics, are only 
now beginning to understand the full scope of the pain caused by 
systemic oppression based on factors such as race and economic 
class.264  
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Experiments involving small-stakes games capture the phenom-
enon of social pain.265 In one experiment, participants take part in a 
computer game in which experimenters tell them that they are play-
ing a ball-tossing exercise with other people who are playing on 
other computers located elsewhere.266 In reality, the experimental 
subjects are playing a game with a computer program.267 At first, 
the ball comes to the experimental subject along with all the other 
apparent “participants.”268 After a while, however, the ball does not 
come to the experimental subject anymore.269 She suddenly finds 
herself excluded from the game, while neuroimaging records her 
brain’s response.270 The results show strong activation of parts of 
the brain involved in experiencing pain, starting once the subject 
starts being excluded and increasing as the exclusion continues.271  
Social neuroscientists have established that when human beings 
experience social pain, it registers as an intense experience.272 The 
long-term effects of social pain are also striking.273 Psychologists 
have found that, at one of the first stages of social exclusion, some 
people try desperately to regain acceptance, even in ways that may 
be harmful to them.274 Researchers theorize that these findings re-
flect the importance of social attachments to human beings’ ability 
to survive, so that humans are “wired” to feel social rejection as a 
terrible problem and to do whatever they think may help them to 
regain entry into the group.275  
At another stage individuals may accept their exclusion and 
move away from the group, finding another source of acceptance if 
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possible.276 Individuals who do not find alternative sources of ac-
ceptance go through another phase in which the pain of social rejec-
tion leads to resignation and then to a host of negative physical and 
social reactions, which can include anger and possible violence.277 
It thus comes as no surprise, as studies have shown, that many of the 
perpetrators of tragic mass shootings in past decades were social 
outcasts during their youth.278 Of course, these are a tiny subset of 
all those who have experienced prolonged social rejection, but it 
might behoove policymakers to work on programs aimed at amelio-
rating social isolation among young people with the goal of helping 
to prevent the long-term harms social isolation causes.  
Other evidence on social pain draws on epidemiological data. A 
large literature documents the connections between racism and ad-
verse health consequences, including depression, anxiety, psycho-
logical stress, cardiac disease, and hypertension.279 Exciting new 
discoveries about epigenetics help explain this intergenerational 
transfer of adverse consequences from trauma. Epigenetics involves 
the study of the heritable transfer of switches that turn genes on and 
off.280  In one key study, scientists examined the descendants of 
members of a Dutch community that suffered through five years of 
starvation during World War II.281 They found that even several 
generations later, epigenetic effects continued.282 The researchers 
documented the transfer of a host of adverse health effects caused 
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by famine to the descendants of the famine survivors.283 Research-
ers are now investigating the epigenetics of racism—in other words, 
how the health effects of racism are passed down from one genera-
tion to the next through the heritable switching on and off of 
genes.284 
This growing body of knowledge about social pain leads to the 
following question: If the human brain is more or less “pro-
grammed” to conform, and if the penalties for failing to do so in-
clude the profound trauma of social pain, why is it that some people 
do not go along with social norms? After all, in all studies on group 
conformity discussed above, a significant minority of subjects did 
not conform—i.e., some participants did not give wrong answers in 
Asch’s experiments or turn the shock dial up to levels marked as 
dangerous in Milgram’s experiment. The question thus arises: what 
caused them not to go along? These questions are covered in the 
study of deviance.  
3. DEVIANCE  
In the 1960s and 1970s, social scientists including Howard 
Becker and Erving Goffman pioneered the study of deviance.285 
Becker, the father of contemporary approaches to the study of devi-
ance, wrote a now-classic book titled Outsiders, in which he posited 
that so-called deviants are socially constructed as such by an audi-
ence with the power to do so.286 As one contemporary expert ex-
plains, “[D]eviance . . . [is] any behavior that violates societal norms 
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and rules and therefore is met with negative reactions or sanc-
tions.”287 In other words, persons labeled as deviant possess no in-
herent quality that makes them deviant; they simply act or appear to 
act differently in a socially salient way. Thus, deviance signals a re-
action to difference or diversity; difference becomes deviance when 
some range of human difference is condemned.288 Put otherwise, in-
groups with the power to do so define some individuals as “deviant” 
according to some measure the in-group chooses to use. These 
measures typically comprise social norms important to the group.289  
This understanding of deviance as violations of a group’s norms 
in a manner a group dislikes allows researchers to avoid any norma-
tive judgment.290  Deviance can include many forms of conduct, 
some of which most people would view negatively, such as criminal 
conduct causing harm to others as well as violations of moral codes 
against cheating, telling untruths, shirking, free-riding, and the 
like.291 Some deviance is morally neutral, such as “acting differ-
ently” in ways individuals cannot control.292 These are the charac-
teristics to which antidiscrimination law tends to apply, because per-
sons are being treated negatively for irrational reasons.293 A third 
category involves deviance that is morally admirable, at least in the 
eyes of some people.294 This category involves individuals who de-
viate from social norms in positive ways and has come to be termed 
                                                                                                         
 287  Søren Kristiansen, Studying Deviance, in DEVIANCE HANDBOOK, supra 
note 286, at 13. “[D]eviance is not a quality of the act a person commits, but rather 
a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions . . . .” BECKER, 
supra note 286, at 9.  
 288  See generally Pat Lauderdale, The Definitions of Deviance, in DEVIANCE 
HANDBOOK, supra note 286, at 3 (discussing examples of when people may or 
may not be labled deviant depending on the observer’s point of view).  
 289  See BECKER, supra note 286, at 8–9. 
 290  See Nicole A. Shoenberger, Bridging Normative and Reactivist Perspec-
tive: An Introduction to Positive Deviance, in DEVIANCE HANDBOOK, supra note 
286, at 24, 24. 
 291  See BECKER, supra note 286, at 8–9; Lauderdale, supra note 288, at 3. 
 292  See BECKER, supra note 286, at 9; ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE 
TREE 170–73, 407–09, 417–19 (2012). 
 293  See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (discussing characteristics 
antidiscrimination law protects). 
 294  See Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 25. 
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“positive deviance.” 295  
The study of positive deviance is fairly new, but can offer much 
to an inquiry into the social neuroscience of acting differently. 
Those who study positive deviance investigate heroes and other per-
sons of particularly high moral courage,296 iconoclasts,297 whistle-
blowers, and “moral entrepreneurs.”298 Research shows that contes-
                                                                                                         
 295  For a general introduction, see Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 24. See also 
SOLOMON, supra note 292, at 170–73, 407–09, 417–19 (investigating many ex-
amples of positive and stigmatized deviance, including geniuses, child musical 
prodigies, and persons with cognitive disabilities, and the like).  
 296  Phillip Zimbardo, the instigator of the Stanford Prison Experiment, in more 
recent years has turned to studying these resisters, whom he calls heroes for re-
sisting the forces that cause conformity. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 488.  
 297  See BERNS, supra note 223, at 15–16 (presenting a social neuroscientist’s 
perspective on the brain characteristics underlying iconoclastic thinking).  
 298  Lauderdale, supra note 288, at 6 (giving examples such as Ralph Nader, 
Mother Theresa, Bobby Seale, Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden, Daniel Ells-
berg, and others, and noting that these figures “fuel the debate on whether they 
are patriots or traitors”). For a case example discussing 1970s anti-war activist 
David Dellinger’s biography, see id. at 7–8. 
Others include “rate busters”—in other words, individuals who receive neg-
ative attention for doing better than the group standard and thus increasing per-
formance pressure on the group. Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 27. This can 
involve morally neutral performances, such as the straight-A high school student 
whom other students dislike; or actions with a moral valence, such as whistle-
blowing or speaking out against unjust acts. See id.; Lauderdale, supra note 288, 
at 6. And, of course, different audiences may have very different reactions: parents 
may admire the straight-A student while fellow students do not, just as members 
of the public may admire the whistleblower even while her employer fires her for 
exposing embarrassing secrets. See Lauderdale, supra note 288, at 6; Shoen-
berger, supra note 290, at 27. For example, members of U.S. society remain 
deeply split about the morality of the actions of national security whistleblower 
Edward Snowden. See Drew Desilver, Most Young Americans Say Snowden Has 
Served the Public Interest, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2014/01/22/most-young-americans-say-snowden-has-
served-the-public-interest/ (finding that fifty-seven percent (57%) of eighteen to 
twenty-nine year olds think Snowden’s leaks served rather than harmed the public 
interest, whereas only thirty-nine percent (39%) of fifty to sixty-four year olds 
and thirty-five percent (35%) of people sixty-five years old or over agree). Indeed, 
research shows that contestation around whether particular forms of deviance are 
positive or negative can drive social and cultural change. One researcher, for ex-
ample, studied the French Impressionists in historical context as a case study 
demonstrating the potential “relativity” of positive versus negative deviance. See 
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tation about how to judge particular forms of deviance often consti-
tutes a driver for social and cultural change.299 Antidiscrimination 
theorists and civil rights historians study this phenomenon too, as I 
will discuss further in Section II.B.1 below. 
Social neuroscientists have further found that groups are most 
hostile to deviance when it is in-group members who violate group 
norms.300 They refer to this phenomenon as the “black sheep” ef-
fect.301 These findings suggest, as I will discuss further in Section 
II.A.4 below, that internal “deviants” or dissenters—i.e., those akin 
to whistleblowers in organizations—require strong antiretaliation 
laws to protect them in performing a socially important role. I move 
on to this discussion by bringing together the social neuroscience 
and legal theory literatures below.  
II. HOW SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE CAN INFORM  
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW  
My aim in this Part is not so much to provide fully formed pro-
posals for legal reform but to put two literatures—i.e., social neuro-
science and legal antidiscrimination theory—into closer conversa-
tion with each other. As I already mentioned in the Introduction, I 
                                                                                                         
Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 30 (citing Druann Maria Heckert, The Relativity 
of Positive Deviance: The Case of the French Impressionists, 10 DEVIANT BEHAV. 
131 (1989)). 
 299  Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 28–30. 
 300  Cf. Alastair Coull et al., Protecting the Ingroup: Motivated Allocation of 
Cognitive Resources in the Presence of Threatening Ingroup Members, 4 GROUP 
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 327, 329 (2001) (finding that the most loyal 
members of groups are the most likely to lash out against those group members 
whose ideas deviate from the status quo). 
 301  Id.; see also Jose M. Marques & Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, The Black Sheep 
Effect: Judgmental Extremity Towards Ingroup Members in Inter- and Intra-
group Situations, 18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 287, 289–91 (1988). This experiment, 
involving students at a Belgian university, found that, in comparison to a control 
group, in-group members—in this case, law students—evaluated poor in-group 
member speeches far less favorably than they evaluated poor out-group member 
speeches. Id. In other words, their judgments about in-group members were more 
extreme than their judgments about out-group members. Id. at 289. Marques and 
Yzerbyt suggest that the black sheep effect reflects a process by which group 
members define good exemplars of their in-group and at the same time strongly 
reject “bad” ones, because they damage the self-esteem that comes from identify-
ing positively with one’s group. Id.  
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see two basic paths for how social neuroscience can inform thinking 
in the antidiscrimination arena. First, more modestly, social neuro-
science can encourage courts and others to adopt an expanded view 
of how discrimination against traditional outsiders occurs. Second, 
from a more aspirational and long-term perspective, social neurosci-
ence can illuminate the need under contemporary social conditions 
for an expanded appreciation of the classic, liberal human right to 
“act differently” within the bounds of others’ rights to do the same.  
Any discussion of the examination of difference in contempo-
rary legal theory must start with Dean Martha Minow’s germinal 
work in Making All the Difference.302 There, Minow applies femi-
nist theory insights into what she calls the “dilemma of difference” 
to point out that human variation becomes difference only because 
those with the power define it as such.303 These ideas have genea-
logical roots in the approaches to deviance Becker and Goffman pi-
oneered in the 1960s and 1970s, as already discussed in Section 
I.C.3 above. Yet Minow goes farther, using feminist insights as ap-
plied to law to point out that antidiscrimination law necessarily must 
grapple with difference because most barriers to equality cannot be 
handled simply by treating all people “the same.”304 People differ, 
and which differences matter depends on which groups have the 
power to decide this question.305 Thus, Minow shows, antidiscrimi-
nation law must figure out how to encompass difference so as to 
avoid simply reapplying rules that perpetuate the advantages those 
with power have built into social norms.306  
Since Minow’s call for hard thinking about difference, many le-
gal theorists have explored related matters. Here I can only highlight 
a few, though a thorough review of the literature would reveal many 
important treatments.307 Most fundamentally, a central trend in the 
                                                                                                         
 302  MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, 
AND AMERICAN LAW (1990). 
 303  See id. at 20, 22. 
 304  Id. at 20 (“The problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating 
members of minority groups the same as members of the majority and by treating 
the two groups differently.”).  
 305  See id. at 20–23. 
 306  Id. (“[R]efusing to acknowledge these differences may make them con-
tinue to matter in a world constructed with some groups, but not others, in mind.”).  
 307  See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 500–
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literature has been to urge greater tolerance for difference as a fea-
ture of antidiscrimination law, just as social science research has 
reached similar conclusions, as I have sketched throughout Part I 
above. How then, practically speaking, could this be done in anti-
discrimination law? Below I highlight several ways in which court-
crafted antidiscrimination doctrines could be “tweaked” in this di-
rection of tolerating difference more broadly. As I go, I will high-
light some of the specific points of consilience between the findings 
of social neuroscience and the insights of antidiscrimination theory.  
A.  Courts Should Expand Their Appreciation for the Complex 
Ways in Which Discrimination Occurs 
1. COURTS SHOULD EXAMINE DISCRIMINATION BASED ON  
PERCEPTIONS OF BEHAVIORAL DIFFERENCE 
Part I discussed the social neuroscience findings that “System 
One” processes, in the terminology of Kahneman and Tversky, can 
trigger negative reactions based on perceptions that someone is act-
ing differently. This linking of discrimination to an actor’s vague, 
negative perception that someone is acting differently has echoes in 
the legal antidiscrimination concept of “performing identity,” most 
thoroughly developed in the late-1990s work of Carbado and Gu-
lati.308 The basic idea is that the social self “construct[s]” itself by 
performing identity in front of others, as Goffman described in 
1971.309 Others react to this performance, and it is this interaction 
that creates identity.310 It can also lead to unlawful discrimination, 
                                                                                                         
02 (2001) (arguing that law must better respect internal dissent within groups 
about cultural norms).  
 308  See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1259, 1292 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Identity]; see also 
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103, 
127–35 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Conversations] (discussing exam-
ples of performing identity in law firms and law faculties); Carle, Agency, supra 
note 28 (pointing to leading civil rights legal historian Ken Mack’s use of social 
theorists’ performance theory in his work); see also, e.g., CARBADO & GULATI, 
supra note 50, at 80–95 (discussing “identiy performance” in the context of  “gen-
der performance” of women in the workplace). 
 309  See GOFFMAN, supra note 157, at 5. 
 310  See id. 
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as Carbado and Gulati explore.311  
Carbado and Gulati examine Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,312 an 
iconic U.S. Supreme Court case on gender discrimination.313 There, 
the Price Waterhouse accounting firm was considering for partner-
ship Ann Hopkins, a talented employee.314 Hopkins had the reputa-
tion for being a hard-charging project manager who was highly de-
manding of team members and unkind to subordinates, but she pro-
duced excellent results that pleased clients. 315  Nevertheless, the 
firm’s partnership voted to postpone her partnership considera-
tion.316 Afterwards, one of the partners who supported Hopkins’ 
candidacy counselled her to “walk more femininely, talk more fem-
ininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry.”317  
Hopkins filed suit arguing that these admissions about the deci-
sion-makers’ motives were direct evidence of illegal gender stereo-
typing.318 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed.319 Price Waterhouse had 
considered other women candidates for partnership before consider-
ing Hopkins, and the firm argued that this showed that it did not 
discriminate on the basis of sex.320 Rejecting this defense, the Court 
held that discrimination could occur based not only on identity per 
se, but also based on stereotypes about how one should behave—or 
perform one’s identity, to use Carbado and Gulati’s phrase—as a 
female.321 A Price Waterhouse partner had squarely admitted that 
the firm rejected Hopkin’s bid for partnership because of gender-
linked characteristics pertaining to how she acted: She did not 
properly engage in the stereotypic performances associated with be-
ing a “lady” partner, as he quaintly put it.322  
                                                                                                         
 311  Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1262. 
 312  490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 313  CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 84–90. 
 314  Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 233–34. 
 315  Id. at 234. 
 316  Id. at 235. 
 317  Id. at 235; CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 84.  
 318  Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 232. 
 319  Id. at 256–58. 
 320  Id. at 236. 
 321  Id. at 251; CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 81. 
 322  Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235. 
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Carbado and Gulati, as well as others, point out that the insights 
the Court stumbled upon in Price Waterhouse have many more ap-
plications.323 Most obviously, discrimination can occur whenever 
employers hold stereotypes about how persons belonging to tradi-
tional outsider categories should behave.324  
Carbado and Gulati identify many ways this can occur. Most of 
their examples focus on large law firms and the law school profes-
sorate, two contexts they know well.325 One scenario involves what 
Carbado and Gulati refer to as “lumpy” good citizen assignments in 
both law schools and law firms.326 These are time-consuming insti-
tutional service assignments, such as being on hiring or diversity 
committees, which take a great deal of time away from the kinds of 
work, such as writing well-placed law review articles or handling 
big deals, that end up being most important to the evaluation of jun-
ior employees at promotion time.327  
Thus, as Carbado and Gulati’s work teaches, discrimination on 
the basis of traditional outsider status can occur based not only on a 
worker’s status per se, but also based on perceptions of what is ap-
propriate conduct for a person of a particular identity.328 Ann Hop-
kins was subject to illegal discrimination not because she was fe-
male, but because she did not perform that identity in a particular, 
stereotypical manner—she did not, in the words of the Price Water-
house partner, act “femininely.”329 Yet she faced a classic Catch-22, 
because the firm at the same time expected her to be hard charging 
in impressing clients and pushing her work forward in the firm.330  
The social science concept of deviance maps onto Carbado and 
Gulati’s ideas of performativity. As Carbado and Gulati point out, 
                                                                                                         
 323  CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 84–94. For other work in this vein, 
see, for example, Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Dis-
crimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004); 
Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of Antidiscrimi-
nation Law: The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling 
at Work, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 369 (2007).  
 324  Roberts & Roberts, supra note 323, at 370. 
 325  Carbado & Gulati, Conversations, supra note 308, at 129–30. 
 326  Id. at 127. 
 327  Id. 
 328  Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1294. 
 329  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
 330  Id. at 234; CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 90–91. 
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persons with traditional outsider identities frequently face Catch-22 
situations. 331 Social norms call on traditional outsiders to signal that 
they realize they are inferior, yet social expectations also call on 
them to present themselves as competent agents in performing their 
positions. 332  This point is central to civil rights historian Ken 
Mack’s important book Representing the Race: The Creation of the 
Civil Rights Lawyer,333 as I have explored in greater depth else-
where.334 Mack shows that mid-twentieth century African American 
civil rights lawyers produced social change through the very act of 
performing their identity as courtroom lawyers.335 In that capacity, 
they necessarily had to act as the equals of the white lawyers and 
witnesses with which they were interacting.336 Put otherwise, Mack 
offers an example of social change produced through positive devi-
ance, a concept I discussed in Section I.C.3.337 Performing identity 
in the conflicted social spaces in which subordination occurs gives 
rise to friction that can lead to positive social change, but it can also 
lead to negative reactions from those in power.338 Those negative 
reactions, interlaced with status discrimination against traditional 
outsiders, constitute classic discrimination—i.e., negative treatment 
based on traditional outsider identity.339  
                                                                                                         
 331  See Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1291. Sometimes per-
sons cannot help but be perceived as deviant, especially when an immutable char-
acteristic is involved. Sometimes they can “cover” their differences, but only at 
great cost to their sense of well-being, as I discuss further in Section II.B.1 below. 
And some people have a high tolerance for risking the opprobrium that comes 
from violating group norms. Some in this category are motivated to violate norms 
out of a sense of higher purpose. Cf. Carle, Agency, supra note 28, at 528 (dis-
cussing Ken Mack’s investigation into how African American lawyers violated 
social norms simply by performance of identity in their regular lawyering).  
 332  Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1294. 
 333  KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012).  
 334  See Carle, Agency, supra note 28 (analyzing Mack’s work). 
 335  See MACK, supra note 333, at 86–98. 
 336  See id. 
 337  See supra Section I.C.3.  
 338  Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1291–93. 
 339  Carbado and Gulati, as well as Mack, teach that the situation is often even 
more complex. People can rebel. They can reject a group norm for ethical and/or 
political reasons. See BERNS, supra note 223, at 10–11 (presenting a neuro-econ-
omist’s explanation of the brain functions involved out-of-the-box thinking). 
 
710 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:655 
Carbado and Gulati urged courts to pay more attention to various 
traditional outsider quandaries about performing identity. 340  Yet 
thus far courts have largely failed to do so outside the sex-stereotyp-
ing context. Social neuroscience can help return attention to why 
they should: The brain may unconsciously discriminate against per-
sons based on perceptions of nonconformity in how those persons 
act in relation to their outsider identities. The mandate by Congress 
banning discrimination against traditional outsiders requires that the 
law reach such discrimination. 
2. COURTS SHOULD TAKE THE HARMS OF WORKPLACE EXCLUSION 
MORE SERIOUSLY  
As discussed throughout Part I above, antipathy toward particu-
lar identity categories can result in social exclusion. Yet court-de-
veloped doctrines sometimes ignore the ways social exclusion re-
sults in unlawful discrimination. 341  Policymakers should revisit 
those doctrines in light of current social neuroscience findings.  
Here is one example: Antidiscrimination doctrine has long pro-
vided, correctly in my view, that an employee must experience a 
“material” harm, such as a loss of pay, promotion, or one’s job, in 
order to have an actionable employment discrimination claim.342 It 
is the existence of such a material harm, also known as a “tangible” 
action, that establishes that the employee has experienced discrimi-
nation in the “terms and conditions of employment,” as required un-
der the statutory language of Title VII and similar laws.343  
                                                                                                         
These types of acting differently also deserve legal protection, as I discuss further 
in Section II.B.4 below.  
 340  Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1293–95. 
 341  See id. at 1293–95. 
 342  Timmons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1128 (7th Cir. 2006) (ex-
plaining that “an adverse employment action must be material . . .”); 1 ABIGAIL 
COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 1:2, at 1-4 (3d ed. 
2017) (“A claimant can establish that the employer has taken an adverse employ-
ment action by showing that the employer has made disadvantageous changes in 
the employee’s terms and conditions of employment that are objectively ‘signifi-
cant,’ ‘tangible,’ or ‘material.’”).  
 343  MODJESKA, supra note 342, § 1:2, at 1-4 & nn.4 & 6 (citing relevant stat-
utes and noting the significant difference in meaning of the term “adverse action” 
under the antidiscrimination versus the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII); see 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012).  
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Although the doctrine itself correctly states the statutory require-
ment, courts have sometimes applied the material harm test too re-
strictively. For example, courts have dismissed plaintiffs’ claims of 
discrimination based on exclusion from informal work groups, train-
ings, social opportunities, and the like, and some courts have found 
no material harm when employers assign workers less attractive 
work within a job classification.344 These holdings tend to be highly 
fact-specific345 and sometimes appear correct. After all, courts can-
not grant relief for every minor incident employees experience at 
work. Yet, sometimes courts’ conclusions on the question of what 
constitutes actionable discrimination appear erroneous, as if they are 
aimed more at clearing cases off dockets than carefully evaluating 
whether discriminatory dynamics are in play.346 Where excluding 
persons from informal opportunities and/or assigning them less de-
sirable work gets in the way of their job success, material harm has 
occurred.347  
Better understanding of the relationship between in-group 
bias,348 social exclusion,349 and discrimination could make courts 
more attuned to how unlawful workplace discrimination  takes 
place. Trivial complaints should not make out an actionable claim, 
lest courts end up even more flooded with antidiscrimination cases 
(already an enormous problem but one outside the scope of this ar-
ticle to discuss).350 But long-term, repeated and persistent exclusion, 
including social shunning linked to traditional outsider identity that 
has adverse implications for job success, should be found actionable 
by courts that examine these facts with more care than they some-
times take today.  
Scholars have also documented other ways in which courts in 
antidiscrimination cases give short shrift to more subtle evidence of 
                                                                                                         
 344  See, e.g., Higgins v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 578, 585–87 (8th Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff failed to establish an adverse action when her job duties were 
changed and she was denied mentoring and training but did not lose pay).  
 345  See, e.g., id. 
 346  See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 191–98. 
 347  But see Higgins, 481 F.3d at 586. 
 348  See supra Section I.A.2. 
 349  See supra Section I.C. 
 350  See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 191–98 (discussing this 
problem in more detail).  
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exclusionary acts in the workplace.351 Terry Smith, for example, 
notes that persons of color, for whom discrimination is a constant, 
raw, and usually un-redressed problem, see discrimination all 
around them, while whites (which continue to represent the substan-
tial majority of judges in both state and federal courts)352 are far less 
likely to notice.353 A workplace encounter that would seem rela-
tively minor absent the element of persistent discriminatory atmos-
phere feels far more intense to a person in a racial outsider category 
who has had the experience of many similar experiences building up 
over time.354  
Courts should be more sensitive to these dynamics, as I have 
argued elsewhere.355 In one iconic Supreme Court case in which the 
majority ignored such facts in ruling against the plaintiff’s claims, 
an employer insisted that an African American be the sole worker 
assigned to clean up after the work of white employees in his same 
job classification and denied this worker training opportunities 
available to white employees who were otherwise similarly situ-
ated.356 In another, the Court rejected a class action lawsuit where 
                                                                                                         
 351  See, e.g., Keri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Com-
ment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149 (2012) 
(critiquing the “stray comments” doctrine, which permits courts to dismiss dis-
criminatory workplace talk and insults as mere “stray comments” that did not fig-
ure into a decision maker’s actions).  
 352  See BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIR-
CUIT AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 5, 17 
(2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43426.pdf (reporting that seventy-five per-
cent (75%) of U.S. circuit court judges and seventy-one percent (71%) of district 
court judges were white as of June 1, 2017); TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. 
YOON, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS 18 (2016), 
http://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf (reporting that eighty percent (80%) 
of state court judges were white as of December 2014).  
 353  Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race Retaliation, and the Promise of 
Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 549–51 (2003). 
 354  See id. at 550. 
 355  Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 203. 
 356  See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105–08, 120–21 
(2002) (holding that admittedly disturbing facts were time-barred for an antidis-
crimation claim because the clock for the statute of limitations begins from the 
time of each “discrete act,” not the totality of the discrimination). For a full ex-
planation of the facts, see Morgan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 
1011–13 (9th Cir. 2000).  
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an employer granted work privileges, such as a separate air-condi-
tioned dining hall and sleeping quarters, to employees in job classi-
fications consisting almost entirely of whites, while relegating to 
rougher, non-air-conditioned accommodations all employees in job 
classifications consisting entirely of persons of color.357 The facts in 
these cases reflect social exclusion of racial outsiders that affected 
their terms and conditions of employment. The majority opinions in 
these cases should have appreciated this. Judicial training on the 
findings of social neuroscience could help increase courts’ aware-
ness in this regard.  
3. COURTS SHOULD REVISE THEIR EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN 
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
In an analytically related but doctrinally different point, courts 
should revise their evidentiary standards in hostile environment dis-
crimination cases. Court-crafted doctrines hold that actions in a 
workplace that create a hostile atmosphere are not sufficiently “se-
vere or pervasive” to give rise to actionable discrimination if they 
do not amount to a change in a “term, condition, or privilege of em-
ployment.”358 These doctrines are analytically correct, but can be 
too restrictive when applied to hostile environment situations.  
Employment discrimination scholars have documented many 
ways in which courts in antidiscrimination cases give short shrift to 
evidence of prejudice manifested through workplace verbal 
abuse.359 For example, under the “stray comments” doctrine, courts 
may dismiss egregious talk in the workplace involving use of the 
“n” word and vile words about women as mere “stray remarks” that 
                                                                                                         
 357  See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 (1989) (holding 
that the plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie case of discrimination); id. at 663 
n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the “plantation” atmosphere reflected in the 
employer’s facilities).  
 358  Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see Sandra F. 
Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Opinion, Boss Grab Your Breasts? That’s Not (Le-
gally) Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html (pointing out that, under 
the high bar the Supreme Court has set for sexual harassment claims, many situa-
tions laypersons would consider sexual harassment are not legally actionable).  
 359  See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 192–95 & nn.28–30 (sum-
marizing this literature).  
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do not tend to prove discrimination.360 Courts’ frequent rulings that 
such acts are not evidence of discrimination reinforce the message 
that expressing bias is acceptable.361 In turn, that message coming 
from the judiciary exacerbates hostility among social groups in the 
workplace, worsening rather than ameliorating the problem antidis-
crimination law aims to address.362  
Neuroimaging studies of the brain show individuals experience 
negative treatment from a group as severely painful,363 as I dis-
cussed in Section I.C.2. This research can inform courts’ under-
standing of the harm of hostile environment discrimination. Those 
findings indicate that working in an environment in which hostility 
toward a social group is frequently expressed is, in itself, a change 
in the terms and conditions of employment.364 Most certainly, work-
ing in an environment inflicting physical abuse would be sufficient 
to meet the standard for discriminatory harassment.365 Courts should 
be more aware that verbal abuse can create severe pain just as phys-
ical abuse does, and should evaluate facts in hostile environment 
cases accordingly. While trivial comments should not be blown out 
of proportion, courts should better recognize that both verbally and 
physically abusive treatment can cause intense and long-lasting 
harm amounting to a change in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.  
                                                                                                         
 360  See id. at 199 n.57; Stone, supra note 351 (critiquing the “stray comments” 
doctrine for allowing courts to grant summary judgment to employers despite 
strong evidence of discriminatory motive). 
 361  See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 198.  
 362  Id. 
 363  Giovanni Nolfe et al., Bullying at Workplace and Brain-Imaging Corre-
lates, 7 J. CLINICAL MED., no. 8, 2018, at 1 (“Moreover, we observed a statistically 
significant link between the hippocampal atrophy and the working environment’s 
dysfunctional phenomena. This significant relationship is related to the work har-
assment and to anomalies of the interpersonal relationships (bullying at work-
place) rather than to the phenomena more clearly related to organizational work-
ing stress.”). 
 364  See supra Section I.C.2. 
 365  See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (explaining that a 
“physically threatening or humiliating” work environment is indicative of hostil-
ity). 
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4.  COURTS SHOULD EXPAND ANTIRETALIATION PROTECTIONS    
All federal antidiscrimination statutes, as well as hundreds more 
aimed at preventing environmental and financial harms, bar employ-
ers from retaliating against employees for complaining about dis-
criminatory or otherwise unlawful employer conduct.366 Happily, 
from the perspective of antidiscrimination advocates, the require-
ments for showing an “adverse action” under antiretaliation law are 
more lenient than the requirements for showing a tangible action or 
material harm under the substantive antidiscrimination provisions of 
various statutes.367 In the antiretaliation context, any employer ac-
tion that objectively would deter a reasonable employee from com-
plaining about unlawful conduct qualifies to establish an “adverse 
action[].” 368  Less happily from plaintiffs’ perspective, however, 
courts have imposed other onerous restrictions in retaliation cases, 
especially as to the acceptable manner of employees’ conduct in op-
posing discrimination, as I have written about previously.369 The 
findings about the black sheep effect, as discussed in Section I.C.3 
                                                                                                         
 366  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012) (prohibiting retaliation for reporting 
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act). For a helpful summary 
of these many federal statutes, see JON O. SHIMABUKURO ET AL., CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., R43045, SURVEY OF FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER AND ANTI-RE-
TALIATION LAWS 192 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43045.pdf.  
 367  See MODJESKA, supra note 342, § 1:4, at 1-49 to 1-52 (explaining the dif-
ference between the definitions of adverse action under the antidiscrimination and 
antiretaliation provisions of Title VII). To make matters even more complex, 
some courts use the term adverse action in the context of both types of discrimi-
nation. Compare id. at 1-4 to 1-10, with id. at 1-49 to 1-52. 
 368  See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 66–67 
(2006) (holding that the threshold for establishing an adverse action for purposes 
of antiretaliation law is lower than under substantive antidiscrimination law; for 
retaliation, an adverse action is any employer action that would tend to deter other 
employees from coming forward with complaints about unlawful employer con-
duct); see also id. at 69 (“[T]o retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly 
training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional ad-
vancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about dis-
crimination.”).  
 369  See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 215–17 (arguing that courts 
should be more permissive in judging the manner in which employees may com-
plain about discrimination without losing antiretaliation protection); see also id. 
at 215–16 nn.140–41, 144–45 (citing additional scholars making similar argu-
ments).  
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above, document groups’ tendencies to be particularly harsh toward 
internal or in-group dissenters (or so-called “deviants”) from social 
norms. These findings are especially relevant in the antiretaliation 
context, in which whistleblower employees typically are in-group 
members of their organizations. Employees bound together by codes 
of secrecy and loyalty find whistleblowers particularly repugnant.370  
As social neuroscience findings regarding the black sheep effect 
attest, retaliation against those who accuse an employer of commit-
ting moral wrongs is particularly likely, even by otherwise lawful 
employers; groups, including organizations, strongly dislike criti-
cism and are thus likely to lash out against internal dissenters.371 Yet 
as Justice White held in Burlington Northern, protecting internal 
dissent of this type is highly important to the proper functioning of 
the nation’s laws aimed at protecting the public interest.372  
Justice White’s observations correspond to the social science re-
search regarding the benefits of dissent and other forms of resisting 
groupthink, as discussed previously in Section I.C.1 above. To en-
courage and protect employees who speak out against perceived em-
ployer wrongdoing, courts should err on the side of providing more 
generous protections against retaliation. Again, a consilience 
emerges between the empirical findings of social psychologists and 
other science-based researchers, on the one hand, and antidiscrimi-
nation scholars and other civil rights policy advocates, on the other. 
This consilience pushes toward greater protection for workplace dis-
senters as well as those who act differently in other scenarios. In-
deed, the social psychology research I sketched in Part I counsels 
greater protection of the right to act differently as a more general 
principle as well.  
                                                                                                         
 370  See ROBERT C. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLE-
BLOWER LAWS 63–65 (2012) (describing a New York City police officer who was 
threatened and harassed for breaking the “code of silence” because he refused to 
take bribes or be complicit in corruption and, subsequently, gained a reputation 
for “ratting out” his fellow officers). For an excellent introduction into the com-
plex topic of the policy behind whistleblower law, see generally id. at 10–34.  
 371  See supra Section I.C.3. 
 372  Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67 (“Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to 
provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which 
accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.”).  
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B.  Policy Influencers Should Press Forward on Recognizing a 
General Human Right to Act Differently 
The proposals I have offered above go to immediate pragmatic 
tweaks to court-crafted employment antidiscrimination doctrine. 
They would not require a fundamental overhaul of U.S. antidiscrim-
ination law but instead change the interpretation of what constitutes 
actionable harm. The last proposal I will discuss is far more abstract 
and ambitious, but merits discussion nonetheless, especially because 
it has emerged as an underlying theme in much recent civil rights 
scholarship. That proposal calls on scholars, lawmakers, and others 
to work toward the recognition of a general human right to act dif-
ferently within the bounds of others’ rights.  While ambitious, this 
is not as outlandish a proposal as it might at first appear. Other 
thoughtful scholars have made variants of it long before me, all the 
way back to the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill.373 In more 
recent times, one such scholar is Kenji Yoshino, who introduced the 
term “covering” to describe how discrimination based on behavioral 
difference manifests itself today.374 
1. RECOGNIZING THE HARM OF “COVERING” AND LIKE VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE RIGHT TO ACT DIFFERENTLY 
Ten years after Carbado and Gulati’s path-breaking work dis-
cussed in Section II.A.1 above, Yoshino picked up the theme of act-
ing differently in a lyrical, genre-bending book that not only dis-
cusses but also models that theme.375 Part memoir, part prose poem, 
and part legal analysis, Covering extends Erving Goffman’s insights 
in Stigma to civil rights policy and law.376 Yoshino explores how 
people struggle to hide nonconforming aspects of what he calls their 
“authentic selves” in order to avoid social disapproval.377 Yoshino 
asks why, more than five decades after the advent of federal civil 
                                                                                                         
 373  See MILL, supra note 58, at 76, 139 (opposing the “tyranny of the majority” 
and arguing for the right of persons to liberty in conduct provided they do not 
harm the rights of others).  
 374  KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 
ix–xii (2007). 
 375  Id. at x–xii. 
 376  Id. at 18 (acknowledging his debt to Goffman’s work). 
 377  Id. at 184. 
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rights protections, so many people still feel the need to “cover” in 
this way.378 Yoshino’s theme, too, is about acting differently; cov-
ering, he notes, involves a demand to suppress “the behavioral as-
pects of identity.”379 
In the personally reflective parts of the book, Yoshino focuses 
on two aspects of his identity. One of these is as a gay man; another 
is as a man of Japanese descent raised in the United States with an 
ambivalent relationship to his heritage.380 In moving terms, Yoshino 
describes examples of times in which he felt the need to “cover” 
with respect to both these aspects of his identity.381 Interweaving 
personal narrative and the legal-analytic parts of his book, Yoshino 
argues for a new civil rights paradigm382 that would essentially rec-
ognize a “right to personality.”383  
Presciently, yet far too optimistically as it turns out, Yoshino 
warns in 2007 that the country’s overwhelming focus on group iden-
tity politics threatens to “balkanize the country into separate fief-
doms of competing identity groups.”384 Almost wishfully, he pre-
dicts that Americans will move toward a new politics of universal 
rights to liberty rather than encouraging the continuing fracturing of 
people into divided identity groups.385 Yoshino acknowledges, how-
ever, that much of the work needed to bring such a concept to life 
cannot be done by law.386 
Unfortunately, Yoshino’s vision for universal rights to liberty 
and tolerance of difference has not come to pass. Its dystopian op-
posite instead looms quite real in U.S. politics today as the nation’s 
                                                                                                         
 378  Id. at 24–25. 
 379  Id. at 24; see also id. at 22 (“Outsiders are included, but only if we behave 
like insiders—that is, only if we cover.”). 
 380  See id. at xii. 
 381  See, e.g., id. at 59–63, 117–22 (relating personal narratives about his dual 
gay and Japanese-descended identities). 
 382  Id. at 183. 
 383  Id. at 189 (invoking the German constitutional “right to personality”).  
 384  Id. at 183. 
 385  Id. at xii, 26–27, 183. 
 386  Id. at 192 (proposing that “law will be a relatively trivial part of the new 
civil rights[,]” and noting that “many covering demands are made by actors the 
law does not—and in my view should not—hold accountable . . .”); see also id. 
at 27 (arguing for “social” rather than legal solutions). 
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divisions along lines of social difference become ever more conten-
tious.387 But this state of affairs only makes Yoshino and others’ 
calls for universal civil rights—including a right to act differently 
along the lines of the classic principles of philosophical liberal-
ism388—even more important. His insights contribute to the arsenal 
of arguments supporting the promotion of human variation as a pos-
itive feature of social life.389 In a politically dangerous time in which 
a number of global leaders are manipulating the strong emotions in-
duced by “us-versus-them” thinking,390 promoting the principle of 
tolerance toward difference becomes all the more important.  
Yoshino’s radical vision for the future has won dedicated fol-
lowers. A recent contribution that builds from Yoshino is Zachery 
Kramer’s book, appropriately titled Outsiders.391 Using engaging 
examples, Kramer in essence argues for a discrimination-based right 
to expression of one’s personality.392 Kramer may not succeed in his 
argument for a right recognized in law, but this work should make 
other scholars take notice.  
Still other scholars, such as civil rights legal historians Risa 
Goluboff and Ken Mack, focus on the theme of acting differently as 
well. I have discussed Mack in Section II.A.1 above. For her part, 
Goluboff explores, in her multiple award-winning book Vagrant 
Nation, a decades-long campaign in the United States to strike down 
vagrancy laws as applied to a wide variety of so-called deviants.393 
                                                                                                         
 387  Cameron Brick & Sander van der Linden, How Identity, Not Issues, Ex-
plains the Partisan Divide, SCI. AM. (June 19, 2018), https://www.scientificamer-
ican.com/article/how-identity-not-issues-explains-the-partisan-divide/.  
 388  See YOSHINO, supra note 374, at 25. 
 389  See, e.g., SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 29–31, 36–39. 
 390  See, e.g., Max Fisher, The Weaknesses in Liberal Democracy That May Be 
Pulling It Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018 
/11/01/world/americas/democracy-brazil-populism.html. 
 391  ZACHERY KRAMER, OUTSIDERS: WHY DIFFERENCE IS THE FUTURE OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS 4–5 (2019). 
 392  See id. 
 393  RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016); Eric Williamson, Dean Risa 
Goluboff Wins American Society for Legal History Book Award for ‘Vagrant Na-
tion’, U. VA. SCH. L. (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/ 
201710/dean-risa-goluboff-wins-american-society-legal-history-book-award-va-
grant-nation.  
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These people included poor and homeless persons, persons on skid 
row 394 —and especially African Americans, even when em-
ployed395—as well as those encompassed under the traditional im-
age of the hobo, or non-geographically attached, freedom-loving 
male wanderer whom Justice Douglas romanticized as a symbol of 
liberty.396 They also included a wide range of others who did not 
conform to social norms and were targeted for persecution under 
anti-vagrancy laws for this reason.397 Thus, as Goluboff puts it, “the 
‘queer,’ the ‘Commie,’ the ‘uppity’ black man, the ‘scruffy’ young 
white one,” all embodied difference; the police and others who en-
forced law were “trained to see difference as dangerous, to see the 
unusual as criminal.”398  
Goluboff thus focuses on the commonality, in the form of shared 
criminal persecution, underlying various forms of deviance. Va-
grancy law bound a wide variety of groups embodying disparate 
kinds of social difference.399  As one key civil rights lawyer ex-
plained, vagrancy laws were used to suppress dissent; war protes-
tors, communists, irascible political contrarians and other political 
dissidents were prosecuted under their authority.400 Those laws like-
wise attacked race dissenters: “[If you are f]or integration[,] [y]ou’re 
a Vagrant.”401 Police applied vagrancy laws to dignified African 
American ministers taking part in civil rights protests.402 They ap-
plied them to arrest mixed race groups in the South403 and to persons 
in the wrong racial neighborhoods all over the country.404  
                                                                                                         
 394  GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 80–81. 
 395  Id. at 115–20. 
 396  Id. at 228–29. 
 397  Id. at 3. Goluboff traces the origins of anti-vagrancy laws to Sixteenth-
Century English concepts of everyone having a proper place; those lacking social 
power who threatened to move out of their proper place faced prosecution for no 
other reason than this, whether they were “‘out of place’ socially, culturally, po-
litically, racially, sexually, economically, or spatially.” Id.  
 398  Id. 
 399  Id. at 3–4. 
 400  See id. at 25–26. 
 401  Id. at 123 (quoting Anthony Amsterdam). 
 402  Id. at 112. 
 403  Id. at 123. 
 404  Id. at 116–17. 
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Likewise, sexual minorities came under their reach, as in prose-
cutions of so-called “vag lewd” charges against gay men and arrests 
of persons of both sexes for cross dressing or even engaging in iden-
tity performances that fell too close to the line dividing the sexes.405 
Vagrancy laws were applied to women having sex outside marriage 
and women and African American men having sex across race 
lines.406 Another application involved defining as vagrants hippies, 
beatniks, and other members of the American counterculture of the 
1950s and 1960s, whom police defined as criminally dangerous and 
“vagged” merely because they violated conventional norms con-
cerning styles of dress, hair, lifestyle and behavior.407 
Goluboff does not focus on the application of vagrancy and sim-
ilar laws to persons with disabilities, but another book fills in that 
important gap. In The Ugly Laws, Susan Schweik documents how 
civic leaders used vagrancy and other laws to banish from public 
spaces persons with disabilities others viewed as unsightly.408 As in 
Goluboff’s narrative, Schweik shows how persons with power used 
laws to exclude and penalize persons regarded as repugnant due to 
their perceived social differences.409  
Both books trace various strains of the complex, decades-long, 
intersectional, coalition-necessitating, and eventually successful ac-
tivism that abolished broad vagrancy statutes as well as ugly laws.410 
                                                                                                         
 405  Id. at 3, 40, 47, 80–81.  
 406  Id. at 306–08. 
 407  Id. at 53–55, 170, 221. 
 408  SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 63 (2009). 
 409  Id. at 24–39, 63–64; GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 3. 
 410  GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 3; SCHWEIK, supra note 408, at 207–29. 
Civil rights advocates argued that these laws violated values involving geograph-
ical and spatial freedom, privacy, equality and nondiscrimination, as well as rights 
to nonconformity, all of which are complexly embodied in liberal interpretations 
of the U.S. Constitution. See GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 298–332. Goluboff 
also tells the story of how the Court has backtracked from these values, illustrating 
that there is no certain path toward greater enlightenment on human rights issues. 
See id. at 341–44.  
As Goluboff further notes, the general theme of expanding tolerance for those 
who act differently had emerged in legal scholarship by the 1970s. See id. at 399 
n.9, 441 n.53 (citing NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 4 (1971) 
(opposing forced therapy for so-called deviants)); see also GOLUBOFF, supra note 
393, at 316 (discussing this theme in other legal scholars’ work, including that of 
Charles Reich).  
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These initiatives contributed to the U.S. history underlying contem-
porary moves to broaden recognition of a general right to act differ-
ently.411  
There is, of course, a long stretch from constitutional law prohi-
bitions applying to government action, on the one hand, and recog-
nition of a general human right to act differently in all spheres, on 
the other.412 But the historical narratives Goluboff and Schweik doc-
ument are telling even though the Supreme Court’s retrenchment af-
ter “the long 1960s,” as Goluboff puts it, wiped out some of the gains 
made.413 A general thrust toward the principle of greater tolerance 
toward all—or, to put it another way, toward constructing a more 
expansive and inclusive circle of regard414—remains an important 
aspirational norm among progressive political forces.415  
It may be that fostering cultural change in this direction, rather 
than imposing legal mandates, constitutes the best strategy. This 
may be for no other reason than the paradox that mandating toler-
ance is itself intolerant.416 This paradox bedevils anti-hate speech 
campaigns.417 It can be seen in the tendency toward over-dogmati-
zation that can arise from too much political correctness. 418  As 
                                                                                                         
 411  See SCHWEIK, supra note 408, at 207–08. 
 412  See GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 318. 
 413  See, e.g., id. at 316 (illustrating Goluboff’s use of the term “the long 
1960s”).  
 414  See generally PETER SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRCLE: ETHICS, EVOLU-
TION, AND MORAL PROGRESS 3–22 (First Princeton Univ. Press 2011) (1981) (pre-
senting a moral philosopher’s take on this concept).  
 415  See john a. powell, Us vs. Them: The Sinister Techniques of ‘Othering’ – 
And How to Avoid Them, GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2017, 7:37 AM), https://www.the 
guardian.com/inequality/2017/nov/08/us-vs-them-the-sinister-techniques-of-oth-
ering-and-how-to-avoid-them (criticizing conservatives for “othering” minority 
groups for political gains while calling for the creation of a “society where ‘we 
the people’ includes all the people”). 
 416  Cf. Victor C. Romero, Restricting Hate Speech Against “Private Figures”: 
Lessons in Power-Based Censorship from Defamation Law, 33 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS L. REV. 1, 12–17 (2001). 
 417  See id. 
 418  E.g., Julia Symons, Essay, Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 
ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/ 
09/10/has-political-correctness-gone-too-far (acknowleding that “some aspects of 
tolerance culture” go too far while advocating for political correctness generally). 
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Yoshino (and many other) legal scholars have noted, not all antidis-
crimination and fairness goals can be achieved directly through 
law.419 Some matters are best addressed, or can only be addressed, 
through “best practices” policies promoted through voluntary action 
in either the private sphere or the gray area in which public law and 
private action intersect.420  
Regulating through voluntary norms, or what is sometimes 
called “soft law,” involves developing principles or standards that 
civil society groups can use to encourage social change; in other 
words, non-government actors can promote adherence to certain 
norms.421 These standards lack the enforcement authority that ac-
companies “hard” law but can be effective through positive example 
and also through negative informal sanctions such as shaming422 
(which, indeed, social neuroscience shows to be an effective tech-
nique for producing conformity, as described in Section I.C.2 
above).  
Below I briefly sketch some soft law or voluntary policies that 
institutions can adopt to promote fairness thinking and “nudge”423 
the law toward an expanded recognition of a right to act differently. 
2. ADOPTING PRIVATE POLICIES AGAINST EXPRESSING PREJUDICE  
A deep appreciation of the mechanisms underlying implicit bias 
can help inform soft law approaches to upholding norms that favor 
antidiscrimination and broader tolerance for difference. Social 
                                                                                                         
 419  See, e.g., YOSHINO, supra note 374, at 192. 
 420  Leslie C. Levin et al., The Impact of International Lawyer Organizations 
on Lawyer Regulation, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 407, 473 (2018) (discussing how 
policies that reside at the intersection between public law and private action can 
affect lawyer conduct). 
 421  See id. at 472–76 (giving an overview of the literature and discussion of 
the relative advantages of soft law approaches); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & 
Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L. ORG. 
421, 434–50 (2000) (arguing that international actors often choose soft laws to 
achieve effective solutions); Benny Spanier et al., In Course of Change? Soft Law, 
Elder Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, 34 LAW & INEQ. 55, 58–
62, 86 (2016) (providing a general overview of the literature on soft law and ar-
guing that soft law can help in the development of elder law and human rights 
jurisprudence as a step toward creating hard law in this field). 
 422  Levin et al., supra note 420, at 475. 
 423  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 123. 
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norms that disapprove of prejudice and stereotypic thinking can help 
reduce bias and increase fairness in decision-making. Similar results 
might come from social signals encouraging the brain to think ex-
pansively about one’s circle of regard.424 As noted in Section I.B.1, 
the worst situation for promoting antidiscrimination values is a so-
cial environment in which expressions of bias are deemed perfectly 
acceptable. In such situations, the mental work of “cognitive con-
trol” to avoid bias does not even begin to occur.425 That work, the 
reader may recall, involves the brain striving, with significant effort, 
to prevent prejudice from entering into decisions about persons the 
brain non-volitionally perceives as outsiders.  
Social neuroscience findings highlight the damage caused by 
flagrant expressions of prejudice, especially by high authority and 
high visibility figures.426  Race supremacists, neo-Nazis, and like 
travelers who espouse ideologies of hate affect other people’s brains 
in ways to which those brains are particularly sensitive, even when 
they are not the ones directly subject to attack.427 Although, at this 
juncture, free speech doctrines restrict the government from banning 
much (though not all) hate speech, that does not mean that the poli-
cies of private institutions cannot do so.428 Below I explore some 
ways in which instituitons can advance soft law in this respect. 
3. PROMOTING DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION AS BENEFITS THAT 
TRANSCEND THE CURRENT CULTURE WARS  
There is currently a healthy political debate going on about the 
benefits and drawbacks of “diversity.”429 There must always be de-
bate about how to translate scientific findings into social policy, so 
                                                                                                         
 424  See SINGER, supra note 414, at 20–22. 
 425  See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text. 
 426  See supra Section I.C.2. They also suggest, as I have already discussed 
above, that courts have been far too lackadaisical in their reaction to use of the 
“n” word and other epithets manifesting bias in workplaces. See Carle, Angry Em-
ployees, supra note 27, at 199 n.57. 
 427  See Romero, supra note 416, at 9. 
 428  Michael Conklin, Walking on a Wire: The Delicate Balance of Free Speech 
on College Campuses, 9 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF REC. 35, 43 (2019) (book review). 
 429  See Rainer Baubőck, Cherishing Diversity and Promoting Political Com-
munity, 1 ETHNICITIES 109, 109–10 (2001) (book review) (sketching the debate in 
political theory on multiculturalism); see also Conklin, supra note 428, at 42–43; 
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this debate is beneficial.430 What has become somewhat lost in it, 
however, is the fact that the benefits of diversity are largely noncon-
troversial to researchers based in natural science paradigms. Indeed, 
prominent natural science-based intellectuals, such as Nobel Laure-
ate Edward O. Wilson, by no means a wild leftist, embrace diversity 
as a biological idea. Wilson writes 
[p]erhaps the time has come . . . to adopt a new ethic 
of racial and hereditary variation . . . . It would give 
proper measure to our species’ genetic variation as an 
asset, prized for the adaptability it provides all of us 
during an increasingly uncertain future. Humanity is 
strengthened by a broad portfolio of genes that can 
generate new talents, additional resistance to dis-
eases, and perhaps even new ways of seeing reality. 
For scientific as well as for moral reasons, we should 
learn to promote human biological diversity for its 
own sake instead of using it to justify prejudice and 
conflict.431  
This consilience between the biologically based sciences and le-
gal theory provides another boost to arguments supporting the pro-
motion of diversity writ large.  
Groupthink research also provides empirical support for diver-
sity. From various disciplinary perspectives, as I have explained 
above, the research on groupthink shows that combining diverse, in-
dependent human perspectives produces more accurate judg-
ments.432 This is one of the reasons  social psychologists argue for 
                                                                                                         
Symons, supra note 418.  
 430  See, e.g., Paul Cairney & Kathryn Oliver, If Scientists Want to Influence 
Policymaking, They Need to Understand It, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2016, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2016/apr/27/if-scientists-
want-to-influence-policymaking-they-need-to-understand-it. 
 431  WILSON, SOCIAL CONQUEST, supra note 80, at 80–81; see also id. at 254 
(“[S]ocieties are mistaken to disapprove of homosexuality . . . . [Gay persons] 
should be valued instead for what they contribute constructively to human diver-
sity. A society that condemns homosexuality harms itself.”).  
 432  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 29–31; supra Section I.C.3. 
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the benefits of diversity writ large.433 From a social science perspec-
tive, as from a natural science perspective, promoting diversity—
defined as many variations in the ideas generated by our so-called 
cultural gene pool—appears highly beneficial.  
These conclusions converge with the fundamental tenets of clas-
sical liberalism. These tenets include the need for a “marketplace of 
ideas,” competition among ideas and the value of not shutting down 
or barring political disagreement—which, it bears noting, are ideas 
different from protecting hate speech.434 These concepts in political 
liberalism map onto theories in both the natural and social sciences 
that promote the value of diversity in human affairs. Evolutionary 
psychologists understand these benefits in biological terms, drawn 
from understanding the benefits of a broad gene pool;435 organiza-
tional psychologists understand them in terms of better group deci-
sion-making, as discussed in Section I.C.1 above. Again and again, 
varying knowledge disciplines return to core principles anchored in 
protecting human beings’ right to act differently.  
The evidence on how the brain processes difference can be 
brought into conversation with the research on social exclusion. Be-
ing subject to ostracization causes individuals to experience social 
pain.436  When people experience social pain (and all people do, 
though to widely varying extents), they sometimes try even harder 
to conform to group norms, exacerbating the negative phenomenon 
of groupthink.437 That feedback loop hurts not only individuals but 
also the performance of groups in which it occurs.438 Thus, promot-
ing difference as a matter of policy requires institutions to conduct 
                                                                                                         
 433  See BERNS, supra note 223, at 104 (“[A] group with a lot of diversity 
among its members is more likely to arrive at a good decision than a group that is 
composed of members who are alike.”). 
 434  See Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of 
Freedom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 789, 793–94. Note that social neu-
roscience helps establish how expressions that dehumanize others in fact diminish 
rich and diverse political speech. Researchers have now documented the harmful 
effects of dehumanizing speech on others’ brains. See supra Section I.C.2. These 
scientific findings counsel in favor of considering revisions in free speech doc-
trines, though that complex subject is beyond the scope of this project.  
 435  See WILSON, SOCIAL CONQUEST, supra note 80, at 80–81. 
 436  See supra Section I.C.2. 
 437  See supra Section I.C.2. 
 438  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 29–31 (noting that research shows that 
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self-audits for where barriers to the inclusion of difference exist.439 
Are there policies that divide or segregate people in one’s institu-
tion? If so, are there important reasons for such policies or do they 
exist merely as a matter of tradition? What do the people on the out-
side of the divide between the in-group and the out-group think 
about their experience, and how would they propose moving toward 
a more comfortable and accepting environment for all? These steps 
are good policy even though they are not embodied in hard law.440 
Moroever, one day some of these policy experiments may become 
incorporated in law, just as has happened in antidiscrimination law 
as well as other fields.441  
4. DEVOTING MORE RESOURCES TO IMPLICIT BIAS INTERVENTIONS 
While researchers are studying how to reduce implicit bias, they 
have found no silver bullet. To the contrary, researchers have found 
that short-term trainings aimed at countering implicit bias do not 
work, though longer-term interventions that rely on multiple com-
ponents to address implicit bias seem more effective.442  The re-
search indicates that professionals can be trained to not act on their 
                                                                                                         
the best performing groups are not necessarily composed of the top experts or the 
best individual performers; instead, the dynamic of diverse viewpoints coming 
together accounts for the superior results groups can produce).  
 439  See Sarah Brown, Auditing Diversity (May 15, 2016), https://www.chron-
icle.com/article/Auditing-Diversity/236428.  
 440  See id. 
 441  See generally, e.g., ANTHONY S. CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM 32–87 (2009) 
(on the historical move from quasi-voluntary standards to hard law in employment 
antidiscrimination law). 
 442  Mimi V. Chapman et al., Making a Difference in Medical Trainees’ Atti-
tudes Toward Latino Patients: A Pilot Study of an Intervention to Modify Implicit 
and Explicit Attitudes, 199 SOC. SCI. & MED. 202, 203–06 (2018) (describing a 
promising “visual approach” intervention aimed at changing medical trainees’ at-
titudes toward Latino patients, which used life narratives and photos Latino ado-
lescents made for doctors in response to the prompt, “What I wish my doctor knew 
about my life”); Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race 
Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 1267, 1268, 1276 (2012) (finding that a multi-faceted twelve-week pro-
gram produced dramatic reductions in implicit race bias, especially among people 
who were concerned about discrimination, while noting that it is unclear if short-
term programs work); Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: 
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implicit biases even though they continue to test as having them. 
One study, for example, found that police officers could be trained 
to not act upon their implicit biases in shooting situations, while ci-
vilians could not. 443 Another leading expert suggests that remind-
ers—i.e., “priming”—can help doctors avoid implicit bias in pain 
prescriptions if given right at the time they are writing the prescrip-
tions.444  
Such research on how to reduce implicit bias is still in its early 
stages;445 much more helpful information promises to be discovered 
soon about how to disrupt implicit bias in the workplace and else-
where. Only time will tell what works, and policymakers interested 
in these matters should continue to monitor research developments.  
                                                                                                         
I. A Comparative Investigation of 17 Interventions, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSY-
CHOL.: GEN. 1765, 1780–82 (2016) (comparing seventeen studies of interventions 
and finding that, when an intervention leverages multiple mechanisms to increase 
their impact on implicit bias preferences, it seems to be the most effective).  
 443  See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and 
Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 
1020 (2007) (finding that both lay persons and police officers showed “robust 
racial bias” in response times regarding decisions to shoot Black versus White 
targets, but for police officers with training, this bias did not manifest itself in the 
decision to shoot).  
 444  See Hidden Brain: Radio Replay: The Mind of the Village, NPR (Mar. 9, 
2018), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=5918954 
26. The following exchange occurred between implicit bias expert Mahzarin Ba-
naji and the podcast host Shankar Vedantam:  
BANAJI: You type in a painkiller that you want to prescribe 
to a patient into your electronic system while the patient is 
sitting next to you. And it seems, to me, quite simple that 
when you type in the name of any pain killer - let's say codeine 
- that a little graph pops up in front of you that says, please 
note, in our hospital system, we have noticed that this is the 
average amount of painkiller we give to white men. This is 
the average amount we give to black men for the same re-
ported level of pain.  
 
. . . . 
 
VEDANTAM: In other words, giving doctors an opportunity 
to stop for a second to make a decision consciously and delib-
erately. This can reduce the effect of implicit bias. 
Id. 
 445  Correll et al., supra note 443, at 1007. 
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A different, older empirical literature documents some of the 
variables that can counter groupthink. Researchers have found, for 
example, that groups are less likely to rely on groupthink if the 
groups are cohesive because they are “commit[ted] to [the] task” 
rather than if they are cohesive because of “interpersonal attrac-
tion.”446 Moreover, small diverse groups foster more individual par-
ticipation and generate a broader array of ideas than do larger, more 
homogeneous ones. 447  In other words, increasing diversity in 
groups that allow for individual participation lowers the likelihood 
of groupthink.448  Some researchers have also found that diverse 
groups often are more productive than homogenous ones. 449  In 
short, promoting diversity in small work groups that relate interper-
sonally can help counter groupthink, a finding that corresponds with 
the complementary strands of literature on discrimination and on 
groupthink I explored in Section I.C.1.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that antidiscrimination law should not 
focus solely on status or identity discrimination, but should also em-
brace the concept of discrimination based on negative social percep-
tions of those viewed as acting differently. To support this thesis, I 
have explored the emerging consilience between the findings of so-
cial neuroscience and related fields, on the one hand, and legal anti-
discrimination theory, on the other.  
Social neuroscience has shown that unconscious, non-volitional 
processes in the human brain detect subtle, socially relevant behav-
ioral differences.450 The brain’s perception of these subtle cues can 
activate neural processes involved in warning about potential dan-
                                                                                                         
 446  See Brian Mullen et al., Group Cohesiveness and Quality of Decision Mak-
ing: An Integration of Tests of the Groupthink Hypothesis, 25 SMALL GROUP RES. 
189, 199 (1994). 
 447  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 29–31, 36–39.  
 448  See id. 
 449  See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman & Wei Huang, Collaborating with People 
Like Me: Ethnic Coauthorship Within the United States, 33 J. LAB. ECON. S289, 
S313 (2015) (finding that the diversity of individuals within a group of scientists 
increased the likelihood that their scholarly papers would achieve renown).  
 450  See supra Section I.A.2. 
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ger. These automatic processes in turn can lead people to shun, neg-
atively judge, treat badly, and illegally discriminate against persons 
they perceive to be acting differently—in other words, as “other”—
based on whatever differences a society defines as socially salient.  
In modern social conditions, human beings often deal with per-
sons who are different from themselves. Indeed, pluralism and labor 
specialization are keys to creativity and efficiency in complex mod-
ern societies. Modern societies, which are politically based on plu-
ralism and economically based on labor specialization, could not ex-
ist without a rich variety of differences among people.451 The non-
volitional brain processes that can react negatively to perceived dif-
ferences are maladaptive in present social conditions.  
It is by no means the case that human beings are incapable of 
interacting across differences. Interacting positively across differ-
ences is a perfectly doable—indeed, often a highly enjoyable—ac-
tivity. The problem is that today’s political conditions raise increas-
ing dangers of automatic neural processes being triggered so as to 
cause discriminatory harms. It thus has become increasingly imper-
ative that antidiscrimination advocates, using evidence-based re-
search, promote appreciation for individuals’ “acting differently” 
(within the bounds of others’ rights) as a foundational value in anti-
discrimination law. 
 
 
                                                                                                         
 451  See Sherwin Rosen, Specialization and Human Capital, 1 J. LAB. ECON. 
43, 43 (1983). 
